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FORWARD
At the time of preparing this thesis there was no indication that events 
surrounding the mid-1989 pro democracy protests would take the violent turn 
that they did. As a result, this work should be viewed primarily in the 
context of the consistent efforts towards the goal of military reform 
during the last decade.
Observers suggest that the June crackdown reinforced the ascendancy of 
conservative elements with one identifiable result being the increased 
attention paid to shoring up both political indoctrination and Party 
control amongst the ranks. Despite the perspective provided by a period of 
one year there is still some confusion as to the long - term impact of a 
conservative backlash on reformists within the PLA.
While this is true, it is argued here that the depth and strength of the 
reform process that had gathered momentum to 1989 represents a change that 
can only be slowed - not wholly reversed. In the context of the 
leadership's reaction of June 1989 and subsequent events the military 
reform process should be seen as following trends identified below. At the 
very least, the open door has exposed many within the PLA to foreign 
equipment, procedures, and attitudes that have already made an impact.
October 1990
INTRODUCTION
There are a number of reasons why an examination of the defence 
modernisation efforts of the People's Republic of China have been of 
particular interest to analysts since the late 1970's. This has had much to 
do with what could be termed the broader context of China's economic 
modernisation in conjunction with an important shift in the way Beijing has 
come to view its strategic environment. This interest has also resulted 
because of the potential that China has displayed in the past for rejecting 
hard-won gains in the face of domestic political turmoil. The capacity must 
be seen to exist therefore for real resistance to military reform that can 
not be traced to the obvious limitations imposed by the sheer size of the 
armed forces or the limitations of the defence budget. The focus of this 
study is the long term tension that has accompanied efforts to modernise 
the Chinese armed forces. It is contended that the last decade has 
witnessed fundamental change, the underlying themes of which have already 
made their impact and will continue to do so despite practical and 
political constraints.
In contrast to the more highly charged atmosphere (in terms of threat 
perception) that dominated the 1960's especially, the past decade has 
witnessed the evolution of a much more relaxed security outlook. This takes 
into account an improved relationship with the Soviet Union and an accurate 
assessment, on the part of Beijing, that Moscow's energies are directed 
elsewhere - especially towards its faltering economy. This recognition of a 
changed relationship was to some extent, given expression by Mikhail 
Gorbachev's Vladivostok Speech of 1986 (repeated in 1988 at Krasnoyarsk). 
Other key elements included improved regional relationships and, in 
general, an acceptance on the part of China's leadership during the 1980's
that the country's modernisation process required a stable security 
environment.
In tandem with the shift in security outlook, another important influence 
on the direction of China's defence modernisation are the internal reform 
pressures that extend beyond military concerns - and indeed are placed 
before the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the context of the "Four 
Modernisations". Beijing recognises that efforts to improve the country's 
agricultural, industrial and technical sectors must be paramount if the 
economy is to be successfully modernised. In essence this has driven 
defence upgrades further down on the national development agenda. The 
challenge has been to re-focus the energies of the PLA along the lines of a 
shift in defence doctrine that takes the above fundamental pressures into 
account. At the same time, the continuing requirements of providing a 
credible deterrent are not to be forgotten.
In keeping with this requirement, modernisation of each service as well as 
improving the capacities of the defence-industrial base remains an 
important goal for the PLA.
These improvements have taken place within a framework that addresses the 
above concerns and pressures by moving from the increasingly inappropriate 
doctrinal framework of Mao Tse Tung's People's War to the declaratory 
policy of "People's War Under Modern Conditions". These are the "modern 
conditions" of a change in security outlook, a change in domestic 
priorities towards economic modernisation and, importantly, a gradual 
change in the military's capabilities.
While the observer will find evidence of a real improvement along these 
lines, this study will take into account the tension that exists between 
declaratory policy and the constraints of modernising such a huge armed 
force. Certainly reducing overall size of the combined services is an 
important first step, but this is just the beginning in the face of 
continuing technological backwardness and the up-hill battle professional 
attitudes must wage against the continued presence of ideological dogma 
that formed such an important part of Maoist People's War. Despite this 
evident tension and these constraints, it will be suggested here that the 
underlying course of policy has been set and that the force structure 
improvements already evident are not likely to be reversed. One likely 
result will be a China that has a much improved scope for a more forceful 
regional foreign policy should Beijing wish to exercise it. Again, the 
changes in each service arm will address how this might be so along with 
some indication as to the constraints (of both equipment and human 
attitudes) acting against this reform.
To place these changes to defence capabilities and doctrine in perspective, 
it will be necessary to explore the key tenets of People's War. Particular 
attention will be paid in the opening chapter to a recognition of the 
conditions that influenced the formation and operation of this doctrine. 
Important elements to consider here include - the political role of the 
"Party Army" in both the pre-1949 and Cultural Revolution periods, as well 
as early indications of reform pressures that clashed with the ideological 
fervour of the mid-to-late 1960's. By extension, an examination of "modern 
conditions" will serve to demonstrate the need for a shift in doctrine away 
from People's War that was recognised in Beijing from the late 1970's.
This, along with an overview of the change in security outlook, is the 
subject of the second chapter.
The final chapter examines in detail recent force structure changes within 
the doctrinal framework of People's War Under Modern Conditions (PWUMC).
The PLA's drive to create a credible deterrent force, capable of limited 
power projection (even within budget constraints), is documented here.
These recent changes are essentially the end result, at the grass roots 
level, of the shift in doctrine. The success that the PLA has had 
represents a substantial departure from Maoist doctrine and is testimony to 
the seriousness with which modernisation has been approached by the PLA.
Chapter 1
BACKGROUND TO CHANGE 
1.1 A Maoist Legacy
One way of approaching an analysis of the impact of Maoism on concepts 
linked to China's national defence is to consider Mao's thought as 
embodying a practical programme for revolutionary action coupled to 
national defence. The essential basis of this programme can be divided into 
two strands - the military doctrinal element, and the equally important 
political support/management factor.
Within these two broad factors one finds the beginnings of a role for a 
"party army" with the ability (if not the sole task) to mobilise the people 
for a fluid, mobile war. Key to the successful prosecution of these 
different forms of warfare was the stress on large-scale political 
mobilisation of the population, the drawn-out or protracted nature of the 
conflict with a better-equipped opponent.(1) When investigating the origins 
of Maoist military doctrine it is then important to demonstrate an 
awareness of the link between the principles guiding an armed forces' 
strategy and tactics, and those with a central role garnering mass support. 
The base assumption recognised by the Chinese Communists when considering 
the need for effective revolutionary organisation, was that "political 
power grows out of the barrel of a gun", a lesson learned following a 
dramatic Kuo Min Tang (KMT) - Chinese Communist Party (CCP) split in 1927. 
It was also a lesson forging the political and military roles of the CCP's 
Red Army closely together, and one that would give rise to some internal 
conflict over the best role for the "party army".
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An analysis of the key Maoist writings that serve to illustrate the origins 
of "Peoples War" should be regarded also, within the context in which they 
were written. The significance of the CCP retreat to isolated rural base 
areas from 1927 through to the Long March of 1934, and the Yenan base 
period during the Anti-Japanese Civil War, lies in the fact that from the 
experiences of these phases Mao was able to formulate and articulate his 
revolutionary and military outlook and build these into systematic 
doctrines. In the years before the Long March (1934), Mao had also been 
able to establish himself as a key figure in the "Chinese Workers and 
Peasants Revolutionary Army".
The early "party army" was a force comprising local bandits, peasants and 
KMT deserters who had joined Mao in supporting a failed uprising in 1927. 
This misadventure was essentially a rout at the hands of better equipped 
and organised Nationalist forces. It was also an important learning 
experience for Mao in that he was forced to consider that longer-term 
organisation, not short term revolution, was going to ensure the CCP's 
survival and ultimate success.
Military Writings in Context:
(i) Sun Tzu - A Traditional Antecedent
Tan Eng Bok traces three essential constituents of Chinese military thought 
of which the Maoist contribution is but one. It is suggested here that in 
considering Maoist military thought (and one way of doing this is to 
examine his key military writings from 1927 to 1949), the ancient tradition 
exemplified by Sun Tzu (but also the Soviet influence of Marxism-Leninism)
is relevant.(2)
3Sun Tzu drew on an intellectual tradition that emphasised the principles of 
mind over matter, thought over weapons, and doctrine over bare strength.
The cultural trait of "man over machine" can be seen to have its roots in 
such considerations with the corollary that "war in Chinese traditional 
acceptance, does not constitute an end in itself, but fits into a greater 
design dominated by politics".(3) In a further section, Sun Tzu emphasises 
the strategy of winning battles without fighting and forcing the enemy into 
protracted operations;
"The skilful leader subdues the enemy's
troops without any fighting; he captures
their cities without laying siege to them; he
overthrows their Kingdom without lengthy o p e r a t i o n s 4)
The opponent is thus denied a guick victory. The defensive element of 
guerilla strategy also has its traditional antecedent in that winning 
without fighting is seen to favour deception,(5) and to encourage an 
offensive only when local conditions are such that the guerillas enjoy a 
tactical numerical advantage and local political (as well as logistical, 
intelligence) support;
"If egually matched, we can offer battle; if 
slightly inferior in numbers we can avoid 
the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, 
we can flee from him." (6)
The guerilla tradition of ancient Chinese military doctrine is taken on 
board as even a cursory dance at Maoist military writings demonstrates. 
People's War however, came to mean more than guerilla operations. Indeed 
such operations were supplemental to mobile and positional warfare - 
concepts discussed in writings that emerged from the mid- 1930's.
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(ii) Military and Non-Military Roles for a "Party Army1
In keeping with the task of longer-term organisation (not short term social 
revolution) for survival, Mao addressed this important question in the 1928 
article "Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist In China?".(7) The 
Red Army was to have a key role in this survival, and although guerilla 
warfare's small unit operations were being finely honed, Mao was aware that 
regular forces were also needed -
"If we have local Red Guards only but no 
regular Red Army then we cannot cope 
with the regular White forces (KMT), but 
only with the landlord's levies." (8)
Rural revolutionary base areas were an integral part of the CCP's 
revolutionary organisation. The establishment of these areas by armed force 
and their maintenance by the same means against successive encirclement 
campaigns, was an accepted necessity. Coupled to this was a strong 
Communist party organisation which practiced "correct" policy by close 
observation of, and involvement with, the peasantry in the "liberated 
zones".(9)
Mao's early thinking along the lines of military and political organisation 
for survival, can be seen to have also been shaped by intra - Party 
disagreement over the role of the military. For Mao the defence role of the 
Red Army was obviously important but only in conjunction with a body of 
principles shaping the military establishment and its relationship to 
society. The Red Army's essential "multifunctionality" must be remembered 
as stemming from early base area politics (working with the peasantry) and 
being extended and systematised according to concrete experience as the
years progressed.(10)
5Along these lines, the army had a role in a number of non-military tasks, 
sometimes equated with "nation-building". Political control of the military 
to facilitate this saw Mao influence a division of labor between military 
commanders and political commissars with the commissars taking on an 
ever-widening range of tasks including personnel administration, schools, 
libraries, theatres, sports, literacy classes, economic production etc.(11) 
Political cadres were directed from the 1929 Kutien Conference, to 
countersign all military orders and indeed to consider themselves as 
co-commanders of military units. This can be seen as forming the roots of a 
basic tension within the army over the relative power of commanders versus 
commissars, as well as within the Party between the modernisation/ 
professionalism advocates and conservatives wishing to retain the "man over 
machine" tradition.
Such disagreements acted to call the unity of the Red Army into 
question.(12) Indeed the "moderates" were often recorded as criticising Lin 
Piao's First Army Group, either directly or indirectly, as being too 
fanatical in following the "men over weapons" line. It was claimed that,
"The comrades in the Fourth Army [of the 
First Army Group]...neither understood nor 
wanted to understand the role of modern 
weapons..." (13)
This had apparently led them to -"..throw the sights of the anti-aircraft 
guns into rivers and take the neutralising substance out of gas masks".(14)
To argue that Mao was only concerned with political direction over military 
prowess would be incorrect. It should be recognised that one served the 
other in Maoist thinking and that the military's close involvement with the 
masses through non-military tasks as well as the organisation of a mass 
militia force were seen as complementary. The need for mass support for
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military success is an important element of People's War, and was a view 
reflected in another important work, written by Mao in 1930 - "Single 
Spark Can Start A Prairie Fire".(15)
Here, the secret to garnering mass support was the dispersal of units to 
practice guerilla warfare, although even here Mao cautioned against 
wholesale reliance on dispersing forces if popular support could not be 
guaranteed -
"It is better not to divide our forces when 
this purpose [winning over mass support] cannot 
be attained or the division of forces would 
lead to defeat and to the weakening of the 
Red Army..." (16)
However, when dispersal of forces is possible, the tactics to be followed 
included dividing units to "arouse the masses" but concentrating them to 
deal with the enemy. Often this would form part of a campaign of "luring 
the enemy in deep" at first, until Red Army forces could retaliate on 
secure ground. The essence of this form of warfare was captured by the 
dictum "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the 
enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue".(17) This form of 
warfare brought the fight to the enemy, only on the guerilla's terms with 
any hint of an opponent regrouping to go on the offensive, being met by 
forces that would blend back into the countryside.
It can then be seen that by the time of the Long March retreat to Yenan, 
the Red Army's experiences in defending the tentative gains of communism 
provided a wealth of practical experience upon which to draw.
(iii) Active Defence in a Protracted Conflict
These lessons were distilled in what could be said to be the more
significant expositions of Maoist military doctrine - the 1936 "Problems of
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Strategy in China's Revolutionary War" and especially "On Protracted Var"
( 1938).
The later work, "On Protracted War," reflected Maos' belief in the micst cof 
the conflict with Japan that any militarily decisive operations were ]ikely 
to be undertaken by regular units. Although outlined in previous writings,, 
this work brought together and clarified the three stages of protracted 
conflict central to Maoist military doctrine. These consisted firstly, of 
the Red Army's strategic defensive to the Japanese force's strategic 
offensive. Briefly this phase was said to consist of the enemy forces 
moving rapidly towards its objective and being confronted by a Red Arny 
employing mobile war tactically - that is, fluid movement by units uncer a 
centralised command. The second stage, "strategic stalemate", is where the 
enemy is forced to protect its occupied territory by tying-up a portion off 
its invading force in fixed positions - the enemy has been "lured in ceep'". 
Protecting lines of supply and communication becomes a greater problen as 
these stretch.
In such situations, active defence (jiji fangyu), a defence of forces 
involved in offensive operations tactically but on the defensive 
strategically, was said to come into its own. The enemy (in this case the 
Japanese, but the KMT was "substituted" post-war) was fighting on exterior 
lines (wai xian) in being dispersed and on the offensive. Such forces 
controlled considerable spaces and communication lines within that space 
had to be protected. The Communists, however, were said to be fighting 
largely on interior lines in the first stage of a protracted war - this 
being characterised by concentrated forces on the defensive and controlling 
less space, but with the added advantage of quick movement between 
defensive points. The attacker was slow to redeploy its forces with thair
longer supply lines.(18)
8Mao in "On Protracted War" saw the advantages in using both combat on 
exterior and interior lines. Offensive warfare on exterior lines was seen 
as necessary to ensure victory, but the interior lines strategy centering 
on base areas was also necessary as offensive battles were to be short, 
with a "bolt hole" of retreating to a base area. While on the offensive, 
"...main force units were to utilise the essence of mobile warfare 
outflanking, encircling, and attacking the enemy while he is on the move - 
in order to turn defensive warfare into a war-winning strategy".(19)
The stages then progressed through a "strategic stalemate", where guerilla 
war comes into its own to harass the enemy's rear echelon, to the final 
stage of the "strategic counter-offensive". In theory, this involved a 
greater emphasis on positional warfare to recover and hold lost territories 
by subjugating major urban centres. This had the effect of favouring more 
conventional unit structures and tactics. However, until this point was 
reached, the fixed battle was largely ignored in favour of mobilising the 
revolutionary masses in the countryside.
This then encapsulated conventional wisdom when it came to guidelines for 
national defence from the 1930's through to the foundation of the People's 
Republic of China (and beyond). While constituting an official view, there 
were in evidence a range of opposing views as well which surfaced at 
different stages of the new nation's history. The analysis to this point 
has attempted to explore the key tenets of the Maoist "Military Art" (a 
term encompassing strategy and tactics) as it developed and adapted to 
changes in circumstance. This is illustrated by the concepts of an enemy's 
strategic offensive or defensive as different strategies and tactics apply. 
The test for the observer currently is to assess what Military doctrine 
dictates for "Military Art" today, and how much the Maoist precepts have 
been revised to take different circumstances into account. Mao exhorted
9his followers to "seek truth from facts", but he was also concerned that 
professionalism and "the purely military viewpoint" could downgrade the 
political role of the Red Army. This role was to become no more obvious 
than during the domestic turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.
(iv) Early Doctrinal Guidance for a People's Navy
Concepts of "maritime guerilla warfare", drawn upon heavily in the 1950's, 
were reinforced by the "Young School" of Soviet naval strategy (dominant 
until the early 1960's).(20) Essentially a rejection of the "blue water 
navy" concept, (which was seen as an offshoot of imperialist ambition) this 
school advocated a coastal defence. Coupled to People's War this had the 
practical effect of creating a navy that consisted predominantly, of small 
torpedo gunboats, diesel-electric submarines and limited-range land-based 
air cover.
Tactics employed clearly illustrated their Maoist heritage. They 
included - rapid concentration of forces for surprise night attacks, close 
quarters combat bolstered and encouraged by political indoctrination, and a 
"man over machine" disdain for advanced technology.(21) The fundamental 
elements were then a tactical offensive within a strategic defensive that 
aimed to "turn China's coastline into a great wall of iron".(22) It gave 
rise to an emphasis on respecting the enemy tactically and thus making the 
best use of the "green curtain" at sea - "the reefs, cloud, fog and waves 
which correspond to trees and crops and other such cover on land...".(23) 
Deception was then to work in the defender's favour as it so often did 
against a more powerful enemy on land.
The "enemy" identified through the 1950's and 1960's as the U.S. 7th Fleet 
but also its "lackeys" (Nationalist forces) and from the 1960's the Soviet 
Pacific Fleet - was accepted as technically superior. Cultural Revolution
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hysteria, and Young School traditionalism however, encouraged the 
continuation of the coastal defence posture. The Maoist contribution was 
especially pervasive and resistant to change. Naval missions were to 
protect the coastline, not project power. When offensive operations were 
necessary, they were to be "like a bayonet charge at sea" in that "It was 
not technique, but politics, the thought of Mao Tse-Tung, that 
counted."(24) Even the 1974 operation to retrieve the Paracel Islands from 
South Vietnamese forces, was interpreted in some quarters as sufficient 
proof of the doctrine’s utility against a "large" and "modern" RVN 
Navy.(25)
From 1976 to 1978 a period of uncertainty followed throughout which it 
became clear that the navy's role was to change, even though ritual 
criticism was still reserved for any who rejected Maoism.(26) This change 
gathered momentum from 1978/79 with a stated emphasis on "combined arms" 
training in multithreat environments, and on the need for younger and 
better educated naval officers.(27)
1.2 Early 1950’s Modernisation and the Cultural Revolution impact
In order to fully appreciate the impact of the political developments (from 
the early 1960's) on the People's Liberation Army (PLA) it is necessary to 
examine briefly the state of the armed forces in the 1950's and what came 
to be expected of them at this time. The Maoist military model was accepted 
as supremely suited to the revolutionary milieu from which it had 
emerged,(28) but as will be suggested, events of the 1950's and the 
responsibilities of safeguarding a new nation dictated that the PLA 
rationalise its organisation and procedures. To a large extent this 
represented the shelving of People's War as an operational concept (29) as 
well as the foundation for the development of a modernised army.
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Jencks identifies a "professional trend" in the new PLA from 1950 onwards, 
the key elements of which included large-scale demobilisation (especially 
of regional and local guerilla units) even before the conquest of Hainan 
Island was completed.(30) The push was on to create a more streamlined 
ground force, but also to devote more attention to the air and naval arms 
of the PLA.(31) In this vital area of equipment (component) modernisation, 
the Soviet connection was central under the 1950 Treaty of Friendship and 
Co-operation and extended from small arms and artillery transfers, to 
combat, bomber and transport aircraft. The means to develop and produce 
their own military equipment were also fostered and it seemed that within a 
relatively short space of time, any gap between Chinese military 
capabilities and the mid - 1950's state of the art, would be much less 
obvious.
Much of this activity was closely involved with the Chinese intervention in 
Korea from October 1950 which, for a number of reasons was to constitute an 
important learning experience for the PLA as well as a lasting influence on 
the shape of this early attempt to modernise. The initial enthusiastic 
contribution of the CPV ("Chinese People's Volunteers") in pushing back UN 
forces was quick to lose its momentum as these forces consolidated their 
positions and began a co-ordinated retaliation using air, ground and naval 
forces in concert.(32) Mobile warfare along Maoist lines had also 
incorporated the element of re-supplying one's force from the enemy, but 
this was clearly not possible against a well organised and entrenched 
opponent which in turn could ensure that Chinese supply lines (already 
stretched by the initial penetration down the peninsula) were under 
constant aerial bombardment.
One of the first "products" of this intensive practical experience of 
modern warfare was the clear recognition of the importance of an improved 
logistical capacity and greater firepower. These came to be seen as of more
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d i r e c t  re levance  to  the  conduct of the  war than any i n s p i r a t i o n  to  be 
der ived  from the  e f f o r t s  of the  p o l i t i c a l  commissars accompanying the  CPV.
The "commanders versus  commissars" d u a l i t y  was thrown in to  sharp r e l i e f  in 
Korea where the  commissars'  t r a d i t i o n a l  r e c r u i t i n g  and i n t e l l i g e n c e  
ga ther ing  r o l e s  were of l i t t l e  use amongst a non-Chinese p o p u l a t i o n . (33)
The PLA's o v e ra l l  commander in Korea, P'eng Te-Huai, was c l e a r l y  aware of 
these  and o the r  d e f i c i e n c i e s .  Jo f fe  sugges ts  t h a t  the  informal dec is ion  
taken by p ro f e s s io n a l  o f f i c e r s  to  r e tu r n  to  a " s in g le  commander" system and 
l a rg e ly  ignore the  commissars must have rece ived  the  t a c i t  approval of the  
PLA's high command.(34) Such a t t i t u d e s  tended to  r e f l e c t  a d e s i r e  fo r  the  
formation of a more p ro fe s s io n a l  f i g h t in g  fo rce  capable  of p rosecu t ing  a 
modern war.
The Soviet  in f luence  can a lso  be t r a c ed  to  the  encouragement of the  
formation of a p ro fe s s io n a l  o f f i c e r  corps from the  mid - 1950' s .  A f a c to r  
rece iv ing  more a t t e n t i o n  in keeping with  t h i s  was the  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of 
m i l i t a r y  academies with  a t tendance  becoming a p r e r e q u i s i t e  fo r  advancement 
in any of the  th r e e  s e r v ice  a rm s . (35) Other changes to  emerge from the  
Korean in te rv e n t io n  included the  i n t r o d u c t io n  of c o n sc r ip t i o n  (a c o n t r a s t  
to  the  PLA's "volunteer"  t r a d i t i o n )  as well  as cutbacks in the  peasant 
m i l i t i a  in favour of an organised reserve  system along Sovie t  l i n e s . (36) 
This f i n a l  example provided, arguably ,  the  sh a rp es t  c o n t r a s t  to  the  t h r u s t  
of p r e - l i b e r a t i o n  Maoist p recep ts .  In being a combination of m i l i t a r y  
s t r a t e g y  and so c ia l  po l icy ,  P eop le 's  War c o n s i s t e d  of " p o l i t i c a l  programmes 
fo r  the  mot iva t ion  of so c ia l  fo rces  and m i l i t a r y  programmes fo r  the  
a p p l i c a t io n  of these  fo rces  to  armed s t r u g g l e " . (37) As such (and as 
d iscussed  in  the  previous  sec t io n )  P eop le 's  War presupposes an army with 
mass support ,  w e l l - r e p re se n te d  by a peasant  m i l i t i a  ready to  drown an
invader in a "human sea" .
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A shift in political events occurred from the mid - 1950s however, just as 
the reforms of China's armed forces began to take effect (to create a 
modern conventional army backed by support units and defence industries). A 
culmination of the criticism of the CCP and its ideology following the 
"Hundred Flowers" campaign coupled to the elitist attitudes exhibited by 
rank-conscious PLA officers, had led Mao to become even more sensitive to 
PLA adherence to Maoist orthodoxy.
The Cultural Revolution and the Army
Re-enforcement of the study of Maoist teachings as well as intensive PLA 
involvement in non-military work, formed a part of the armed forces drive 
to ensure the re-ascendance of Mao to the top political echelon (following 
"Great Leap" failures). Although the PLA under Lin Piao provided a basis of 
support within the armed forces, it was chiefly the political commissars 
and other confirmed Maoists who had been disadvantaged during the 1950's 
modernisation drive that represented the bulk of this support.(38)
This period's impact in the longer term included the residual effects of 
lost defence production time, de-emphasis of technical education and 
expertise, and the denigration of professional military values (as 
exemplified by a regular officer corps). In the short term, the PLA's role 
in the intra-Party "shake-up" led to constant re-deployment of regional and 
main force units to "support the left".(39) This dramatically illustrated 
the heightened political role of the armed forces.
Constituting a marked change in direction from the previous decades' 
attempts to modernise, the PLA had been directed to abandon ranks and 
distinctive uniforms. Directives emphasised the supporting role that the 
PLA had to play, to the young student radicals (Red Guards) aiding Mao in 
the consolidation of his position. Problems arose amongst the turmoil
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however, when local garrison forces began to support local Party officials 
against the undisciplined excesses of the student radicals. It was partly 
for this reason that the supposedly more politically reliable main force 
(corps) forces were ordered to separate the antagonists and assume 
political control in the provinces. Having few ties to the local Party 
bureaucracies, corps units were deemed more likely to "support the left". 
Being committed to largely political (and public order) tasks, these units 
were then subject to the sort of random re-location undertaken by regional 
commands. Important exceptions included units deployed in areas of high 
perceived threat such as the North Korean border, the Fukien front with 
Taiwan and the Sino-Soviet border (especially in the North-east). Nelsen 
observes on this point:
"Peking's political control over its main 
forces and its military regions was strong 
enough for it to select its corps on the 
basis of military expediency".(40)
Extreme adherence to Maoist precepts stressing active political 
participation on the part of the "People's Army" was not allowed to divert 
attention from the need to safeguard sensitive areas as well as 
strategically important R+D. China's nuclear weapons programme was allowed 
to develop through a period that required most to be "red and expert". On 
balance however, following the Maoist line in Peoples' War and emphasising 
greater attention to political indoctrination over military training for 
modern warfare had an undeniably stultifying effect on PLA development, one 
that was not likely to begin to be rectified until Mao's influence was
weakened.
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Chapter 2
THE DIRECTION OF MILITARY Modernisation
2.1 The Wider Context of National Modernisation
Although initially finding a place as third of the "Four Modernisations" 
(behind agriculture and industry, but before science/technology), national 
defence was dropped quickly to the fourth position. The politics of 
modernisation has tended to place the advocates of military modernisation 
at a disadvantage, in that their proposals are often expensive and need to 
await infrasture reorganisation elsewhere.(41) It will be shown also, that 
the lower the perceived threat (a more benign security environment), the 
lower the priority to defence and especially to the creation of the sort of 
professional fighting force that is an anathema to hard-line Maoists. It is 
proposed here to undertake a brief analysis of the political context of 
modernisation in post-Mao China with attention paid to its impact on the 
PLA and the formulation of a "new" doctrine guiding its activities.
The first phase of the modernisation drive came from 1976-78 under the 
auspices of the "neo-Maoists" under Hua Guofeng. Anxious to maintain the 
legitimacy of his power base, Hua and his supporters were careful to avoid 
direct criticism of Mao, instead focussing on the "Gang of Four" who were 
accused of sabotaging the true wishes of Mao.(42) Constant references were 
made to the supposed wishes of Mao and Zhou En-lai, to modernise in the 
early 1970's only to have their directives thwarted by the "Gang" (43), The 
PLA was claimed in 1977, to have always been the focus of legitimate 
attempts to modernise;
"Chairman Mao at once stressed 
putting politics in command and 
pointed out the importance of 
becoming proficient in technical 
and professional work..." (44)
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Such attempts however were supposedly overwhelmed by the combined negative 
impact of Lin Piao and the "Gang";
"The gang allowed nobody to
mention improvements or work
on improvements. According to
its reactionary logic, we should
not have atomic bombs, make
new weapons or equip our PLA units
and militia forces with new weapons".(45)
A watershed for the pragmatists under Deng came with the Third Plenum (of 
the Eleventh Central Committee) in 1978, which saw Hua replaced as Chairman 
of the Party's Military Affairs Commission (MAC) and his days "numbered" in 
the premiership and party leadership posts. The end-result here was a new 
emphasis on a longer-term developmental strategy under the title of 
"Socialist Modernisation".(46)
Reinterpretation of history led to official condemnation of the period from 
the "Great Leap Forward" to 1978 and an acceptance of Maoist failings as 
having a detrimental effect on national development. The inevitable 
negative reaction from within the CCP from those who owed their positions 
to a previous adherence to Maoism (and indeed who had gained their 
positions during the Cultural Revolution), did however dictate that Deng 
tread carefully and avoid direct confrontation. In keeping with this, Deng 
consolidated his position by the time-honoured method of maneuvering 
supporters into top positions and conservatives onto the retirement list. 
Both the Secretary-General of the MAC (Yang Shangkun) and the PLA Chief of 
Staff (Yang Dezhi) were noted supporters of Deng as was the Minister of 
Defence Zhang Aiping, (formerly the head of the Science and Technology 
Commission for National Defence).(47)
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Each were said to accept that the military's place in the "Four 
Modernisations" means that substantial economic development must take place 
first with a "trickle-down" effect benefiting the military. Zhang voiced 
the new orthodoxy when he stated,
"Modernisation of our national 
defence must be based on our 
national economic construction...
[The PLA must] carry out...strict 
budgeting within the scope allowed 
by the limited amount of funds 
allocated by the state..." (48)
However it has been stressed (perhaps to "sweeten the pill" for military 
commanders) that weapons procurement and development is not to be frozen 
but maintained steadily. By working within its fourth place, future funding 
for defence modernisation will increase and technological breakthroughs 
will be made more available for national defence. The budget allocation for 
defence has been cut however, from 15.3% (of total State expenditure) in 
1982 to 10.5% in 1985, 9.4% in 1986 and 8.9% in 1987.(49) It is difficult 
however to assess the real costs of defence in socialist economies and 
China's case is no exception. While defence spending has declined in terms 
of GDP (12% in 1978, 5% in 1989) (50) and in total State expenditure, this 
must be qualified by noting that the defence budget is presented as a 
single category within the state budget. It does not indicate 
defence-related expenses incurred by other ministries and, thus, that the 
defence burden is shared by other economic sectors.
On the contrary, modernisation's impact on the increasing efficiency of 
military administration could account for the official figures.(51) 
Streamlining plus manpower cuts may permit "substantial" modernisation 
within a budget declining in real terms. Even so, the point has been made
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that the defence outlay does seem to be declining, even taking manpower 
reductions into account over the last decade.(52)
The Soviet Union
A reassessment of the nature of the threats faced (in the early years of 
the 1980's) illustrated a more complex approach. This has taken into 
account, Soviet ventures in Afghanistan, the resistance encountered by 
Moscow in the Third World towards her so called "imperial ventures" and 
dissension in Eastern Europe.(53) Beijing is clearly aware of the pressing 
nature of two key domestic problems faced by Moscow - the economy and her 
minority nationalities as well as the Kremlin's desire to relax tensions in 
the Far East. This last point is of course, related to the hopes Moscow 
entertains, of developing the economic infrastructure in this area - hopes 
that were reflected in the 1986 Vladivostok Speech delivered by Gorbachev.
Emphasising the Soviet Union's role as a Pacific power, this speech 
constituted a major policy statement as well as an "olive branch" to the 
Beijing leadership. A willingness also, to cooperate in joint development 
projects along the frontier such as water-management power schemes along 
the Amur River was suggested by Gorbachev, to coexist with the 
"understanding and respect" ordinary Soviets had for China's modernisation 
drive.(54) Moscow is unlikely to be expecting the degree of enmeshment that 
occurred in the last decade with Sino-Western (especially Sino-American) 
economic relations, but it is clear that efforts had been undertaken on 
both sides to expand commercial, scientific, and cultural relations.(55)
These advances in easing tensions are not insignificant. The Soviet 
military buildup has continued in spite of the Vladivostok initiative 
however (although the undertaking to withdraw from Afghanistan has been 
honoured to the extent of troop withdrawals). Varying reports place Soviet
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ground force levels at upwards of 57 divisions (43 of these east of Lake 
Baikal).(56) These forces under the Far East theatre command, represent 
about one-fourth of the total Soviet ground forces and have been updated by 
recent qualitative additions. These include - "increasing their firepower, 
manoeuvrability, protective power and battlefield defence capability, in 
addition to chemical warfare capability".(57) The Chinese are also taking 
into account, recent augmentation of Moscow's Far East theatre nuclear, 
naval and air strike forces.
More than 170 mobile SS-20's have been deployed in the Far Eastern theatre 
since 1977, mainly along the northern Mongolian border and covering China, 
Japan and much of the region.(58) Nuclear-capable strategic bombers such as 
the "Backfire" are now also deployed by the Air Force and Naval Aviation in 
the Far East. Their numbers (approximately 80) (59) represent a significant 
addition to Soviet regional air strike potential. Sub-surface strike forces 
(the Delta in SSBN is a recent addition) are in significant numbers and 30% 
of all Soviet SLBMs are on Pacific Fleet submarines.(60)
China must also consider that one-fourth of the Soviet airforce (including 
the MIG-29, Sukhoi "Frogfoot") is deployed in the Far East comprising some 
2,200 combat aircraft.(61) Vietnam is now (and since 1978) doubly 
significant to Moscow, in providing basing facilities for Soviet aircraft 
extending their range/presence throughout Southeast Asia as well as key 
naval facilities.
Finally, Soviet naval forces in the Pacific are a highly visible reminder 
of Moscow's intention to be seen as a Pacific Ocean power. The Soviet 
Pacific Fleet is the largest of the Soviet fleets (comprising 800 ships of 
various types) (62) and has not lacked major additions in recent years. 
Among those platforms deployed to such bases as Vladivostok, Petropavlosk, 
Sovetskaya Gavan and Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay, are VTOL aircraft aboard a
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second aircraft carrier, the Delta III SSBN and Kara-class cruisers. In 
all, 73 principal surface combatants are deployed which provide China's 
naval forces with a serious challenge.
The above forces could conceivably be utilised against China in a range of 
scenarios. It is worth gualifying these however, with the observation that 
the current security environment is perceived as favourable for China, 
especially given both Moscow and Beijing's desire for greater economic, and 
other, cooperation to aid the latter's modernisation. The Soviet troop 
withdrawals from Afghanistan in accordance with the Geneva Accords have 
been matched by the withdrawal of approximately 260,000 troops from the 
frontier (with China) "and three quarters of its troops in Mongolia". 
Vietnamese assurances of withdrawals from Cambodia by September of 1989 
were also made.(63) Chinese defence planners are also aware of the 
inclusion of the SS-20's in the INF Treaty (with these scheduled for 
destruction). Despite this Beijing must still consider a wide range of 
threat scenarios involving the augmented Soviet forces as noted above. Such 
strategic options as borderlands subversion as a prelude to annexation had 
an historical background from the 1960's. The "raw material" for this 
option exists in the antagonism between Han and minority peoples,(64) but 
constitutes less of an opportunity today due to racial assimilation and, 
especially in the Northeast (Manchuria), massive frontier deployments to 
cover the industrial infrastructure present there.
Other conventional invasion scenarios have been mooted but must be accepted 
as involving the risk of escalation to a nuclear level despite NFU pledges. 
These included operations along similar lines to the successful 1945 soviet 
push into Manchuria - an operation involving combined arms forces which 
surmounted formidable geographical barriers. Co-ordinated incursions could 
involve air, land and sea forces (the latter to provide naval bombardment 
and sea lift) with a technical superiority offsetting a Chinese numerical
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superiority. Uncertainty must be seen to accompany any ground invasion 
scenario - centering on recent Chinese force structure and organisation 
improvements as well as the threat of retaliatory nuclear action. If a pre­
emptive strike against China's nuclear weapons and facilities is a serious 
option, there is still the very real uncertainty of the composition of any 
second-strike retaliatory forces. Dispersal and camouflage may guarantee at 
least some response. Again, force improvements will be shown (in the third 
chapter) to have the result of maintaining uncertainty as to which Chinese 
systems would survive and to their penetrability (of Soviet airspace).
The United States
A similar range of threat is not perceived in the case of the United 
States, although both Moscow and Washington were seen as in "imperialist 
collusion" against China in the 1960's. An element of "sophistication" in 
world outlook was introduced as America began to pullback from Vietnam and 
make overtures to Beijing from the early 1970's - contributing to the 
"Three Worlds" theory originally attributable to Mao. The relationship 
through the 80's was characterised by considerable economic "enmeshment", 
especially as a result of Sino-American investment through the "Open 
Door" - note this as evident on surface but problems remain. Important 
defence related issues (high-level military visits; technology transfer of 
dual-use and defencerelated technology) have also created a more prominent 
security dimension to the Sino-US/Sino-Western relationship. Coupled to 
this China's search for advanced technology to boost export-oriented growth 
has led her to value US and Japanese joint ventures especially.(65)
Trade Volume comparisons are significant. 1985 trade with the United States 
totalled $7.7 billion (compared to $1.9 billion with the Soviet Union) 
although this is not as fast-growing as that with some other Western 
countries, (especially the European Community).(66) Cultural and
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educational exchanges were targeted by Gorbachev in 1986 as one area where 
improvements could encourage normalisation in the relationship. If so, 
Moscow has a long way to go to match the nearly several thousand Chinese 
scholars studying in American universities (and numerous Western 
institutions) (67) and the educational programmes run by joint-ventures, to 
familiarise the Chinese with Western equipment and operating procedures.
American forces in the Pacific cannot be said to provide the sort of 
immediate and continual reminder of aggressive power that the 
above-reviewed Soviet forces do. This contributes to a situation where - 
"China's reformers know who threatens them, and recognise that seeking a 
genuine equidistance [between the superpowers] would entail succumbing to 
the pressure the Soviet Union has brought to bear".(68)
Constraints on the Sino-US relationship include the latter's close 
relations with Taiwan, but it could be said that the requirements of 
modernisation have introduced an element of long-term confidence with 
respect to eventual unification through peaceful (economic) means. It is 
certainly not an issue that is being permitted to obstruct Sino-US 
relations with the implications this could have for China's broadly-based 
modernisation.
Japan
In completing the Beijing Moscow - Washington - Tokyo "quadrangle", it is 
useful to briefly consider Japan's importance to China. Some consideration 
of this fourway relationship is important in that the pattern of 
interaction between China and these powers "largely determines the 
strategic choices confronting the leaders in Beijing".(69)
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Despite persistent reminders of Japanese occupation, reform minded leaders 
have generally tried to encourage closer economic ties with Tokyo. While 
becoming the most important international financial market for China (70), 
Japanese firms rank behind Hong Kong and the US in relation to foreign 
investment. Concerns over internal policy stability were perhaps lessened 
up to mid-1989 may be lessened by the strenuous efforts now undertaken by 
China to ensure the continuity of "Open Door" policies. However, the 
security relationship is likely to continue to intrude, especially as 
China's military modernisation progresses.
To these factors must be added the greater stake that China is seen to have 
in regional stability to aid her modernisation. Beijing and Tokyo share 
common concerns over the growth of Soviet military power in the Pacific and 
indeed the forces tied down on the Sino-Soviet border could be moved even 
closer to Japan if Chinese-Soviet relations approach normalisation. The 
fact that China is not about to encourage full rapprochement with Moscow 
would tend to reinforce this atmosphere of a commonality of interest. For 
their part, Chinese leaders, while conscious of the spectre of Japanese 
"militarism", see Japan's "Self Defence Forces" (especially when directly 
supported by the US) as a significant defence "counter-weight" to Soviet 
Far East forces - one that at least complicates Soviet contingency 
planning.(71)
Vietnam
China's relations with Vietnam have been complicated in the past by 
Beijing's continued support for the Khmer Rouge forces as well as Moscow's 
continued support for Vietnam. Both commitments have a long history and 
are unlikely to change for some time.(72)
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It can certainly be seen, however, that a number of factors have combined 
to moderate both Beijing's perception of threat as regards Vietnam and 
conseguently to moderate its policy towards that country. Improved 
relations with the Soviet Union have had a role here. Moscow should be 
seen as having little to gain from Sino-Vietnamese conflict, especially 
given the Soviet's desire to improve upon its strategic position in the 
Pacific as outlined by Gorbachev at Vladivostok. Ngok Lee suggests that it 
would be highly unlikely that Moscow would supply the Vietnamese with 
nuclear-capable strategic weaponry for these same reasons - that it could 
ultimately undermine Moscow's regional position.(73)
Coupled to this there is the added complication of Hanoi's defensive 
posture along its border with China which would surely reduce the 
likelihood that an assault by the PLA would achieve significant gains. In 
1979 Beijing learned first hand of the difficulties to be faced in 
attempting to "teach Vietnam a lesson" for its support for Soviet Union in 
South-east Asia.(74) Vietnam's subseguent investment in ground forces and 
air defences at the border is not likely to have made this task much 
simpler for Beijing in the intervening years. Klintworth suggests along 
these lines that - "Even if a large-scale ground attack on Vietnam was 
considered practical, and assuming that it had unanimous leadership 
support, there is no guarantee that it would succeed".(75)
Finally there is the lessening of the complication provided by Hanoi's 
invasion and occupation of Cambodia. Undertakings of phased withdrawals in 
the late 1980's were certainly welcomed although confidence in both the 
process and its permanence was not universal.(76) Any indications of less 
than wholehearted support by Moscow for that occupation needed to be 
balanced by the fact that Moscow will continue to regard its relationship 
with Vietnam as strategically important.
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A remaining (and persistent) problem are the offshore islands and seabed 
resources of the South China Sea over which the two countries have 
previously come into conflict. This is certainly one area that has the 
potential for continued disputes as PLAN capacities are developed with the 
goal of affirming Beijing's claims in mind. This problem is returned to 
below in considering the growth and role of a modernised Chinese navy.
These factors, on balance, would seem to suggest that while tensions 
continue to remain they have lessened somewhat and need to be taken into 
account with evidence of improved Sino-Soviet relations (and a reduction in 
the threat Beijing perceives from Moscow via Vietnam). To a large degree 
then, China's focus on its domestic economic modernisation has, when 
coupled to improved Sino-Soviet relations, reduced the tension and urgency 
that surrounded the Sino-Vietnamese relations a decade ago.
2.2 China's Strategic Outlook and Threat Perceptions
It is because Beijing perceives that both the superpowers and Japan (for 
example) have something to gain for a relaxation of tensions and a boost to 
scientific, economic, political and cultural exchanges - that threat 
perceptions have been adjusted.
As the discussion in the third chapter points out, modernisation and the 
military has focussed upon long term objectives of reform that reach far 
beyond a simple cut in manpower or improvements to weapons and equipment.
A strategic outlook that poses less of a threat has enabled these moves to 
fundamental reform. In a world that is moving from confrontation to 
dialogue, Beijing has clearly been involved in making the sorts of 
decisions that stem from less of a sense of acute vulnerability (vis a vis 
the superpowers) than from a feeling that "China's present strategic
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circumstances are more favourable than they have been since the mid­
nineteenth century".(77)
To maintain this favourable environment, China has been careful to pursue 
an independent foreign policy of "balanced ambiguity" between the US and 
the USSR. At the same time Beijing sees an advantage in encouraging an 
easing in US Soviet tensions for such a climate provides the setting for 
long term modernisation. In occupying a fulcrum position between the two 
superpowers, China sees itself as being placed to prevent any one of them 
from becoming too dominant - in other words China wants its strategic 
situation to reflect the fact that the world is no longer bipolar but 
increasingly multipolar.
This shift in outlook outlined above, has been seen to take into account 
the role that Beijing now perceives itself as playing in the strategic 
balance. While the threat of imminent conflict has been removed however, 
Beijing continues to be mindful of the fact that if any threat remains it 
is from the Soviet Union primarily and from the danger of being drawn into 
a conflict to its south over Cambodia (although even here the immediacy of 
any threat can be argued to have diminished). Any urgency associated with 
a need for a crash programme may not be evident presently but the potential 
for conflict still remains with the most clearly defined threat coming from 
the Soviet Union. It is from this outlook that People's War Under Modern 
Conditions has emerged in the last decade, to take advantage of and lend 
added direction to military modernisation.
2.3 "People's War Under Modern Conditions (PWUMC): Continuity, Changes,
Constraints.
It should be evident that the new military doctrine that has emerged from 
the competing mix of factors discussed above, will be itself a mix of
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enduring realities and flexible adaption.(78) The definition of military 
doctrine - "the fundamental principles by which the PLA [in this instance] 
is to guide its actions in support of ... national objectives in the event 
of ... attack",(79) suggests that military modernisation needs to concern 
itself initially with those fundamental principles. From these, updated 
strategy, tactics and important advances in weapons technology and 
non-material means of modernisation can emerge.
The "fundamental principles" that formed a part of Peoples War doctrine 
have been illustrated to have an emphasis on mass mobilisation, the use of 
protracted war (along three phases) and the overall defensive nature of the 
doctrine. It accommodated tactical offensives within a strategic defensive 
and could be said to have made a virtue of qualitative weakness. The 
requirements placed on the military as a result deserve reiteration, and 
included the need to play close attention to political guidance of the 
masses to ensure this support base. Technological inferiority was to be 
compensated for by this reliance on the "human element" which involved the 
strengthening of the so called "subjective initiative" (political 
commitment and morale) in the face of a stronger opponent.
Today, there is considerable evidence to suggest that such fundamental 
principles continue to play a role in the face of this far superior 
opponent. Threat assessment has tended to place a land attack from the 
Soviet Union as being the area of China's greatest vulnerability, and 
debate still focuses on this rather than strategic air or naval attack.(80) 
It is accepted as central that the Soviets cannot be allowed to have 
unimpeded access to a position where they can invade to threaten China's 
northern cities. At the same time however, China is not yet in a position 
to meet all threats at the border by relying (in these areas) on fixed 
defences (that are the stuff of positional warfare). In 1945 the Japanese 
Kwantung Army crumbled under a Soviet onslaught as the Red Army entered
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Manchuria, a defeat the Chinese attribute to their lack of in-depth 
defences and an over-dependence on their logistical base (which was 
susceptible to aerial bombardment).(81) Lessons drawn from this include the 
need to prepare such in-depth defences to cover the most likely routes of 
invasion which are judged to be the key mountain passes guarding access to 
the populous north-eastern basins.(82) These are known approaches where a 
combined armour and mechanised infantry assault could be slowed if not 
halted. The attacking forces are not offered resistance by main force units 
in this early stage, especially before they each the southern edge of the 
Gobi Desert and are confronted by the Greater and Lesser Hingnan Mountains. 
Indeed the mobile Soviet forces are said to hold the advantage up to this 
point, on the level terrain they initially encounter.(83)
The aggressor is then, ideally, channelled towards the main force units, 
lured by the prospect of destroying China's major population and industrial 
centres and in this way China's cities are bait to the PLA's trap. "Luring 
in deep" then still plays a role although the PLA is not prepared to 
give-up these key centres;
"By luring the enemy in deep
we do not mean letting the
troops go wherever they like
but we will force them to move
as we want them to; at key
places we will put up a strong
defence, prevent them from penetrating
inland unchecked and systematically
lead them to battlefields of our choice
so as to wipe them out piecemeal".(84) [My emphasis]
Joffe and Segal see this "modified luring in deep" strategy emerging from 
doctrinal guidance to be prepared for "modern conditions", as proof of a 
compromise with older Maoist concepts.(85) The assumption of the ability to 
take advantage of Soviet supply lines to separate the advance guard from 
its logistical base, does owe something to concepts formulated during the
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"Anti-Japanese War". The enduring reality of a huge poor peasant population 
then continues to shape defence policy and it would seem that PWUMC 
reflects this. A defence doctrine must be capable of serving a dual role 
that of providing credible defence today, whilst also being able to 
accommodate updated equipment and the military operations in which they 
will be utilised. The population problem also places some priority on 
overall economic modernisation, to support the growth (and ageing) of the 
people. This in turn means less funds available for defence modernisation 
making the old "men over machine" credo, the only current option for 
credible defence against ground invasion.
Changes demanded by the characteristics of warfare under "modern 
conditions" also need to be assessed as they tend to lead to a wholesale 
departure of the fundamental Maoist tenets in military doctrine. An 
acceptance of the key role of contemporary technology in making the early 
stages of a conflict of greater importance is one example.
Here the debate has centred on modern battlefield technology making 
strategic rear areas unsafe and thus calling the "protracted war" principle 
into serious doubt.(86) The initial course (and pace) of a war is likely to 
be greatly effected by the range and accuracy of Soviet nuclear and 
conventional weaponry. A protracted war relies on secure and steady 
logistical ties to rear areas, which are also used to assemble reserve 
forces before deploying them to the battlefront. If rapid, deep attacks on 
these areas are undertaken initially by an opponent, planners in Beijing 
cannot rely on a drawn-out conflict to "wear the enemy down". Changes to 
fit this dilemma include then, a greater emphasis on positional defence at 
the frontier (especially in the industrial northeast) and the placement of 
forces at key points to slow a Soviet advance.(87) This is in effect a 
compromise solution adopted until force structure improvements allow the 
Chinese greater scope for offensive operations at an early stage.
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Other changes are found in the emphasis placed on the fact that infantry 
forces alone would be insufficient to halt a combined armour/mechanised 
infantry and air assault of the type expected. The combining of forces 
(combined arms within services and combined services) is deemed necessary 
for adequate defence under "modern conditions" as well as proper attention 
paid to improving logistics by rejecting "The enemy as our best 
quartermaster" philosophy.(88) The more complex nature of the technology 
that the PLA must confront, also dictates that they acquire some of their 
own, especially that associated with effective command and control. Given 
the demands of training to accommodate the new equipment and tactics, a 
further demand of "modern conditions" is that the PLA spend more time in 
training for combat and less in political indoctrination. PLA commanders 
may still stress that "Chairman Mao's military thinking is the most 
advanced and powerful ideological weapon of our time ... ", but the above 
changes in strategy suggest that other changes such as a regular 
professional and well-equipped army led by a professional officer corps are 
necessary.(89)
The PWUMC doctrine's flexible (or perhaps transitional) nature is more 
clearly observed at this point. It can accommodate traditional Maoist 
precepts to placate the "Long March" conservatives and because the PLA has 
not yet fully modernised, but it also represents a commitment to improve on 
this base that ultimately threatens to abandon the traditional precepts in 
all but name only;
"In leading the work in the army,
Comrade Xiaoping has always
adhered to the basic principles of
Mao Zedong thought. At the same
time he is also skilful in closely
linking these principles with the
new situations, issues and characteristics
in army building".(90) [My emphasis]
33
In keeping with this, it is stressed repeatedly that Deng is
"opposed to the dogmatic attitude of 
indiscriminately copying Mao Zedong's 
military thought and disregarding 
realities [which reguire the Party to]... 
unhesitatingly put forward new ideas 
and work out new policy differences".(91)
A number of trends initiated to accommodate "modern conditions" in warfare 
from the late 1970's and early 1980's and to provide a reasonably 
comprehensive defence against ground invasion, represent a genuine attempt 
to come to terms with the most likely perceived enemy and threat scenarios. 
The requirements of modernisation are clear, but still the PLA would 
confront real problems in any attempt to repulse a large conventional 
force. It is also possible that the "stalling effect" of PWUMC's positional 
and mobile fighting, may lead to Moscows' decision to rely on the shock 
effect of battlefield nuclear weapons or chemical-biological weapons.
The definition of security tasks facing the Chinese leadership is an 
on-going process. It should be clear that common to the changes to be made 
to national security policy is the requirement for sustained, long-term 
efforts but impeding these efforts are a range of constraints slowing the 
process.
Impediments to Policy Change (92)
Domestic constraints to modernising the military include the immense size 
of the armed forces in absolute terms - a factor which must surely limit 
the scope of any modernisation effort. Service-by-service efforts to work 
within this framework will be chronicled below (in the following chapter), 
but in general terms, the institutional and budgetary burden of supporting
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the world's largest ground force, third largest navy and airforce, numerous 
support arms, as well as a growing nuclear force is considerable.(93)
Even so, it is recognised as a necessary task, one that is slowed by what 
one observer termed "the two basic constraints to the PLA modernisation 
drive" - a lack of funds and needed technology.(94) The lack of hard 
currency available for the military has received treatment above, but the 
constraint of an inadequate technological base deserves further mention.
Assimilation of high technology is a problem that can trace its origins to 
the effects of the Cultural Revolution and its disruption of research and 
development. Coupled to the lack of a technology exploitative culture such 
weaknesses are manifested today in the nation's defence-industrial sector. 
Here the paucity of skilled labor has led to uneven development in weapons 
systems and equipment so that China's offensive nuclear capacity and 
related space technology is respected globally, while her conventional 
weaponry is largely outdated.(95) Coupled to this, and underlying all of 
the above is the conservative mentality of the bureaucracy and elements 
among the leadership who are comfortable with an army that can field more 
light infantry troops and weaponry, than any other. Conservative 
standpoints are also an off-shoot of the degree of autonomy evident in 
Chinese security planning - autonomy that is reflected in the almost 
entirely independent defence industrial base, even if it requires 
reorganisation and technical upgrading.(96)
A final underlying impediment to policy change concerns the predilection of 
a part of the Beijing leadership, to rely on political and psychological 
approaches to national security over trying to match an adversary's 
military power.(97) Improving the technological level of defence-related 
equipment and making selected purchases overseas all feature in the PLA's 
modernisation drive, but the politico-diplomatic battlefield can also bring
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victories with weakness turned to advantage in closer links with the 
West.(98) The political approach must be seen as one constraint on those 
elements within the leadership which clamour for increased funding for 
military modernisation.
Perhaps the first impression that may be derived from an overview of the 
new doctrine is the fact that it retains fundamental principles that were 
central to People's War, while acknowledging the importance of being 
prepared for modern conditions. Part of this preparation deals with the 
priority now attached to active defence which favours positional warfare 
with mobile and guerilla operations playing a supporting role. In this way 
PWUMC turns the previous doctrine on its head. Modern conditions also 
dictate familiarity with improved equipment and the training required to 
use it effectively as the hardware reaches the new combined arms 
formations.
It has been seen that the reforms process has had to progress in the face 
of an element of conservative resistance and perhaps the best indication of 
PWUMC's flexible nature is that it acts to combine both old and new. Here 
too are a number of clues as to the doctrine's strength and utility. By 
incorporating tested principals of warfare on Chinese soil, with selective 
improvements at the doctrine and equipment levels (developed at home and 
abroad), reformist elements have managed to avoid being seen as bringing 
China's reliance on foreign sources to an unacceptable level. As is to be 
demonstrated in the next chapter, domestic R+D has been joined to selected 
concepts and upgraded technology that have long been utilised by Western - 
equipped forces. At the level of doctrinal guidance significant advances 
have therefore been made and have already made their own impact to become 
firmly a part of China's military modernisation.
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Chapter 3
CURRENT IMPACT OF DOCTRINAL CHANGE
3.1 Defence Industries: Strengths and Weaknesses
"Peoples War Under Modern Conditions" dictates that weapons modernisation 
and modernisation of advanced military technologies (C31, electronic 
warfare, PGMs, engine/airframe production) must be coupled to important 
changes enabling the financial and technical assimilation of these
upgrades. Even so, the weapons and equipment the PLA must use and the
related support of logistics etc. are important issues in themselves. The 
question posed here, is that given the requirement of modern warfare on the 
PLA for combined-arms operations and quick response (as outlined above) - 
can the defence industrial base support that growth? What are some of the 
constraints upon it doing so?
From the start a qualification is necessary, Beijing's forces cannot
possibly hope to even approach parity with Soviet forces, and this is
accepted in China. Joffe observes that "the essence of this [modernisation] 
strategy ... is to rebuild the PLA for far narrower ends" - that is - to 
cope with a limited incursion.(99) An added "bonus" is the improved ability 
to defend against smaller regional powers with Vietnam a key example. 
However, until the military industrial system can adequately meet even the 
more "limited" current demands, the emphasis on People's War guidelines is 
likely to persist. This would be to the detriment of the country's ability 
to deter, even limited aggression.
Many of the problems faced by China's defence industries today, stem from 
the Soviet influence on the 1950's attempt to modernise. In the 
early-to-mid 1950's, China relied heavily on an input of military material
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which included the plans and expertise to establish indigenous production 
lines. While this influence had an enormous positive impact and dictated 
the pace of defence modernisation, there has been the suggestion that 
Moscow "purposely withheld the expertise and means to develop new weapons 
systems".(100) An important result of Soviet aid, came with the rapid 
expansion of productive facilities during the 1950's especially (but 
continuing after the Soviet pull-out in 1960, albeit at a slower pace), 
which provided an excess in manufacturing capacity.(101) This was not a 
problem while the Soviet threat (and that of the US) loomed large. It was 
however, to force a re-allocation of priorities when it was deemed that the 
Soviet threat was longer-term and more limited.
"Under Modern Conditions"
The post - 1978 drive to boost economic modernisation was seen by some 
elements within the PLA as a chance to secure a pre-eminent place for 
defence industrial modernisation. Justification for this "defence-first" 
stance hinged upon the apparent "spin-off" benefits for the entire economy 
and the demands that would be made on science and technology by military 
industry.(102) The final decision - to tie defence modernisation to 
economic progress - had a direct impact upon budgetary allocations. This 
reinforced an overall yearly trend whereby the proportion of GNP devoted to 
defence production been dropping since the early 1970's.(103) The defence 
industries (nuclear, aviation, electronics, ordnance, shipbuilding and 
space) have then, due to restricted funding limiting foreign technology 
purchases, had to produce a more sophisticated product with fewer resources 
and within a posture of maximum independence.
Strong demands were then placed on the capacities of the industry that have 
been inadeguately met. Some of the blame for this must be attributed to
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Soviet unwillingness to boost China's design-engineering and systems- 
integration capabilities, perhaps because of traditional Russian fears of a 
resurgent China uninfluenced by Moscow. The end-result was that Chinese R&D 
became limited to a few major projects (Jammes suggests just one or two 
models in each type of major weapons system) (104) and in these, efforts 
became restricted towards incremental improvements and "reverse­
engineering" of selected foreign components. A key example of this is found 
in the efforts made to provide the PLAAF interceptors with an improved 
engine. The Rolls Royce Spey turbofan represents one example of Chinese 
defence industrial capacities. It was hoped that the defence industries 
could absorb foreign technology without being drawn into an overly 
dependent relationship with a foreign corporation.
Negotiations for this particular piece of technology had culminated in an 
agreement stating that the Chinese would licence-build the engines with 
facilities and technical expertise provided by the systems designers.(105) 
By the early 1980's the project had stalled however, over a combination of 
a lack of metallurgical design expertise (an inability to produce an 
airframe to accommodate the Spey at supersonic flight) as well as related 
problems in fabricating highly heat-resistant components for the 
engines.(106) The eight-year effort (from 1975) demonstrated that China's 
defence industries were still labouring under an inability to do little 
more than upgrade 1950's vintage Soviet designs, especially in this area of 
high-performance aircraft. Subseguent Chinese adaptions may indeed 
represent major improvements over the original, and are a cost-effective 
option given financial constraints, but it could be argued that this still 
leaves some major problems in the defence industries unsolved.
Such problems (lack of technical know-how) are coupled to an unbalanced 
approach to R&D which sees strict vertical integration of the industries
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restricting the cross-transfer of research results between enterprises. 
Research is separated from production in China.(107) New research efforts 
are seen as important, but the system suffers from an inability to apply 
the results to the production line. This is due largely to centrally- 
planned management practices which overlook guality and innovation in the 
search for fulfilled quotas.(108)
While the Chinese work to overcome such systemic difficulties, the observer 
can trace evidence of the impact of the modernisation drive on military 
industry such as the integration of civil and military production. PWUMC 
incorporates the view that China's security environment is stable while 
modernisation dictates that broader national economic issues must take 
precedence. An industry that has been demonstrated to have an excess in 
productive capacity is an obvious target for diversification. The official 
line for weapons manufacturers is exemplified by the following statement 
made in 1985;
"We can say that now is an 
opportune time for the defence 
industry to shift its main efforts to 
the scientific research and production 
of civilian products ... A strong 
country with good prospects will 
surely strengthen the construction of 
the national defence and help the 
development of weaponry".(109)
The fact that out of four hundred military enterprises, two-thirds are 
producing goods for the civilian market, should not disguise the fact that 
this changeover has not been trouble-free:
"With civilian goods, the [defence] factory 
must face all kinds of competition, collect 
its market data, find its own funds and raw 
materials and then market the products 
itself".(110)
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Despite the fact that because of economic pragmatism some enterprises are 
now being left to slide into bankruptcy, some managers and workers in 
defence production enterprises consistently demonstrate a poor knowledge of 
the market and poor quality control.(Ill) Many enterprises have problems 
meeting contracts and delivery schedules,(112) even with the high demand 
for consumer goods ensuring a ready market.
Aerospace Industry
The state of China's aerospace industry contrasts greatly with that 
concerned with conventional defence production. Advances here hold 
significance, not only for the Strategic Missile Forces but for the 
country's growing commercial space programme.
The provision of reliable and relatively inexpensive launch vehicles for 
Western satellites indicates that much effort has been put into the 
development of facilities and advanced technology. Through a long period of 
R&D Chinese technicians have acquired a solid grounding in the design and 
fabrication of space vehicles, carrier rockets, orbital control equipment, 
heat resistant materials as well as the production of cryogenic (low 
temperature) fuels.(113) This fuel is utilised in the new 3-stage CZ-series 
boosters. Advances in solid fuels also made the 1982 underwater launch of a 
new SLBM possible.(114)
Important "spin-off" benefits from the aerospace programme include the 
development of a world standard tracking and transmission network that 
controls China's satellites and is capable of receiving satellite 
transmissions in all 29 provinces.(115) Flow-on benefits from the mastery 
of space camera optics and re-entry film capsule technology for military 
use, are directed towards weather monitoring and earth resources 
applications.(116)
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Such advances obviously serve to make the space and missile industry a high 
profile one and need to be considered to balance out the often gloomy 
picture presented by the other defence-related production industries. These 
industries of course, tend to benefit from advances in the space technology 
field as improvements in electronics, computerisation and remote sensing 
technologies (for example) find applications on armoured vehicles, at sea 
and in tactical aircraft. Such broad-based efforts are essential if each 
service is to improve its capabilities. Despite the constraints evident on 
any quick change to defence industrial capacity it would be a mistake to 
dismiss this sector, especially when the achievements of its aerospace 
industry are examined as an example of what can be done given the proper 
funding and other support.
3.2 Modern Conditions and Professionalism
The trend in China's national defence away from People's War, has had to 
contend with economic, technical and military backwardness - all elements 
that helped to give rise the Maoist doctrine which had spawned a light 
infantry tradition. The factors determining China's timetable for defence 
modernisation have been found to be a longer term threat environment and 
the overall constraints of national modernisation. The result is that, 
within the context of the "Four Modernisations", the downgrading of defence 
modernisation (especially conventional modernisation), has placed 
organisational and manpower reform at a premium with weapons upgrades to 
follow. Indeed, the funds saved by this "regularisation" (zheng gui hua) 
have become available for hardware and other improvements.(117)
With this in mind, the following elements need to be considered under the 
heading of "professionalism/regularisation". Education and training for an
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"at the gates" defence strategy demonstrates the degree to which the PLA 
will go in a bid to modify People's War. Logistical strengthening, and the 
structural reform of military region and Field Army amalgamations, all 
illustrate something of the military's efforts to support a "people's war 
under modern conditions". All (suggest Heaton) (118) throw current issues 
of the problems of military modernisation in China, into sharp relief.
Education and Training
(i) The Military Service Law
The issue of professional military education and training has the tendency 
to pose a number of broader guestions. These include, that of the 
relationship between ideological and technical values; the role of the 
military in society; and the pursuit of an effective national security 
strategy in PWUMC. Military education is also an important vehicle for the 
socialisation of the PLA's "leading cadres" (officer class), and relates to 
the broader politics of modernisation.(119)
1984 was a landmark year for the reorganisation of education and training
practices, with the promulgation of the Military Service Law. Strictly
speaking, the changes that were made at this time were amendments to the
original law of 1955, but they were deemed to be urgently needed
nonetheless. PLA Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi emphasised the following in
explaining the changes:
"Basically speaking, the law [of 1955] is 
fine and has played an important role in 
strengthening the building of China's army...
...In the past 30 years, however, the 
situation has undergone a great change.
We must not only build the Armed Forces 
into a powerful, modernised, and regularised 
revolutionary army, but must also further 
strengthen the building of the militia and 
perfect the system of reserve duty, so that 
we shall lay a good foundation for quick 
mobilisation during wartime".(120)
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Central to this directive, were a set of measures that effectively set the 
tone for subsequent efforts to regularise the officer corps. It was 
stressed that the sort of "leading cadres" necessary to lead a modernised 
army were those that were "more revolutionary, younger in average age, 
better educated and more professionally competent".(121) This became 
somewhat of a "catch-cry" to be repeated constantly as the principle goal 
to be met by the vastly proliferating military academies.
"We must indeed place education and 
training in a strategic position by 
strengthening education and training 
in military academies, making a success 
of in-service training and encouraging 
self-study".(122)
(ii) Military Academies
The growth of the military academies tends to illustrate the sensitive 
issue of "dicing" with ideological precedent. Mao was never against 
modernisation per se (his emphasis on the need to acquire nuclear 
technology for its military and political leverage must be remembered) but 
it was only to be on Maoist terms. Harlan Jencks saw this reservation most 
clearly in Mao's unwillingness "to see the emergence and growth of the 
technical, educational, and managerial elites which always accompany 
technological development".(123) China's social revolution and all that it 
meant for the continuing dominance of Mao's thought would be in danger of 
being compromised. To this end, the Cultural Revolution's denigration of 
professionalism saw the number of military schools drop from 140 to 40 - 
"Like education in general in China, military education ground to a
halt".(124)
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Changes followed quickly from 1978 under Deng, so much so that the Military 
Service Law, far from initiating a trend, was in fact reflecting previous 
efforts. By 1980 there were 54 basic-level institutions catering for high 
school graduate entry to courses of upwards of four years duration.(125) 
These were both general command and technical schools for officer 
candidates.(126) The true significance of the catch-cry's emphasis on an 
overall improved education and technical competence was felt in the 
arrangements for middle and upper level cadres (up to and including the 
General Staff). To this end, the official stress on education as the key to 
promotion was outlined in the Military Service Law and was to be served by 
a restructuring of the officer school system.
Currently, each service has its own schools at basic, intermediate and 
advanced levels for the training of entry-level cadres and candidates for 
battalion, regimental as well as divisional command.(127) The peak 
institution in this system (at the advanced level) is the National Defence 
University (NDU) (128) which fosters the study of combined arms/joint- 
service operations for Group Army commanders. There is a related emphasis 
on the strategic "think-tank" for the study of Soviet strategic thought, 
and the lessons of recent Middle Eastern conflicts and the Falklands War. 
The best students from the academies are invited to remain as instructors 
and indeed the active encouragement of intellectuals in the PLA is an 
oft-reported feature of current professional education in China.(129)
Another feature is the incentive provided by the reintroduction of ranks 
and insignia. These were restored by 1988 and consisted of "Eleven Ranks in 
Three Classes" - that is, "general, field and junior officers'1 from Second 
Lieutenant to First General.(130) Ranks, which were deemed in 1965 to be 
"feudalist, capitalist and revisionist", are now seen as an important 
indicator of general military reform.(131) Specifically, they are seen as a
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reward fo r  m er i to r io u s  s e r v ice  and in d i c a t e  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e g r i t y ,  a b i l i t i e s  
and the  serv iceman 's  p o s t / r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Defining c l e a r l y  the  p o s i t i o n  and 
r o l e  of both o f f i c e r s  and (u l t im a te ly )  e n l i s t e d  personnel i s  s a id  to  
encourage c o n cen t ra t io n  and s p e c i a l i s a t i o n  "so t h a t  they can give f u l l  play 
to  t h e i r  s k i l l s  in  modernising the  Army".(132) The next t a sk ,  w i l l  be 
perhaps to  pay some a t t e n t i o n  to the  PLA's pay s ca le s ,  which lag f a r  behind 
those  a v a i l a b l e  to  s e m i - s k i l l e d  f a c to ry  workers earn ing  s u b s t a n t i a l  
bonuses.
( i i i )  "Cracking the  I ron Rice Bowl" (of Guaranteed Employment)
The po l icy  of promotion on m er i t ,  (not s e n i o r i t y )  to  s p e c i f i e d  ranks was 
s i g n i f i c a n t  fo r  ju n io r  o f f i c e r s  as well as ve te ran  cadres  in t h a t  i t  
r ep resen ted  changes in  what both c a te g o r i e s  could expect from the system. 
The "up or out" m e n ta l i ty  has then led to  o f f i c i a l  p re s su re  fo r  the  
re t i rem en t  of s en io r  o f f i c e r s  to  make way fo r  the  academy t r a in e d  
s p e c i a l i s t s .(133)
The c la sh  between t e c h n ic a l  and id e o lo g ic a l  impera tives  i s  s t ro n g e s t  here .  
The "Long March" gene ra t ion  cannot be expected to  happily  r e l i n q u i s h  the  
s t a t u s  and p e r q u i s i t e s  t h a t  come with  permanent p o s i t io n s  in  the  PLA 
h ie ra rchy .  Indeed the  e f f o r t s  of the  modernisers to  "crack the  i ron  r i c e  
bowl" in in d u s t ry  are  not so e a s i l y  d u p l ica ted  when i t  comes to  m i l i t a r y  
r e t i r em en t .  There i s  no formal requirement fo r  PLA r e t i r e m e n t .(134) 
Never theless ,  the  promotion of younger, b e t t e r  educated cadres  hinges on 
p laces  being made fo r  them, and the  o v e ra l l  d r ive  fo r  p ro fess iona l i sm  
hinges on " d i lu t in g "  the  b u re a u c ra t i c  tendency to  c l in g  to  what i s  known. 
This demands g en e ra t io n a l  change and reduc t ion  in the  p o l i t i c a l  ro le  of the  
PLA - something t h a t  was ev ident  up to  mid-1989 and i s  c l e a r l y  evident 
c u r r e n t l y . (135) I t  a l so  r e q u i re s  t h a t  the  economy be able  to  support  the  
rap id  r i s e  in  the  numbers of demobil ised s o l d i e r s .(136)
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A current feature of the drive to ease-out the geriatric high and 
middle-level cadres, is to ensure that there will be adequate housing and 
on-going employment opportunities for them.(137) Despite the good 
intentions, the sheer size of the problem has placed a huge burden on local 
authorities seeking to transfer and place demobilised cadres. On top of the 
normal demobilisation process, over 70,000 officers were to be retired from 
1986 (although 100,000 were already retired by early 1986).(138) Current 
reports indicate that cadres trained in much-needed disciplines (foreign 
languages, medicine, computer sciences, management) are readily placed in 
government departments and the private sector.(139) The majority however, 
are not faced with a demand for their services and this is likely to become 
a compounded problem as more personnel are removed from active duty in the 
coming years.
(iv) Combined-Arms Training
Apart from officer education, the entire body of the services need 
familiarisation with joint-service operations for the air-land (and naval) 
battle. This means co-ordination of all arms from the infantry (ideally a 
more mobile and mechanised force), artillery, ground-based air defence, 
land transport, communications etc, to the airforce (ground support, 
interdiction, transport, reconnaissance) and naval units.
Coordinating exercises that demonstrate combined-arms operations is 
currently placing demands on the academies to produce officers familiar 
with the characteristics of services other than their own.(140) Special 
attention is also paid to exercises predicated on the opponents' use of 
tactical nuclear weapons,(141) a possibility that places real demands on 
equipment designers. For example, the EMP and chemical warfare protected 
tank comes into its own here, as do decontamination units/practices.
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The first large-scale exercises in several years were held in 1978 and have 
continued annually to familiarise individual units with the demands placed 
upon them when operating as a combined force. Following a particularly 
large-scale combined services exercise in 1981, Deng Xiaoping was quoted as 
observing:
"...These exercises have given us an 
opportunity to assess our achievements 
in building modern, regularised armed 
forces, and have simulated modern warfare 
fairly well. They represent part of our 
effort to explore combined operation 
by the various services and arms under 
modern conditions".(142)
Within these combined exercises, the emphasis is reportedly upon increasing 
familiarisation with high technology command and control systems.
Automation for combat command has included the deployment of a 
Chinese-character information processing network (143), as well as portable 
artillery command systems incorporating micro-computers and laser 
positioning.(144) Such systems are quickly utilised in exercises when they 
are ready for deployment (according to recent reports).
Structural Streamlining
(i) Manpower reductions
Training and combined arms exercises are important examples of professional 
reform, but the observer needs to recognise that they form a part of a 
broader structural reform programme:
"The fundamental goal of the structural 
reform, streamlining and reorganisation... 
is to build our Army into a crack force. 
Without reforming the Army structure, 
it would also be impossible to improve 
combat ability".(145)
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One factor that has received much attention since 1985, have been the 
manpower cuts made in order to build a smaller army and avoid the situation 
which moved Deng to comment in 1975, "We can't say that every division is 
bloated, but it is definitely true to some extent of the army as a 
whole".(146) By 1987 manpower reduction had seen the PLA trimmed from 4 
million personnel to 3.2 million, a figure accepted as still being 
maintained. This is despite reports of 700,000 servicemen either as 
demobilised or redeployed from the PLA in 1987.(147) The bulk of these were 
in the ground forces and especially the less - well armed and organised 
garrison forces.(148) A smaller army conforms more closely, to the new 
military doctrine which envisages positional and mobile defence against a 
limited attack and as such requires fewer (but better trained) troops than 
under People's War.(149)
(ii) The New Group Armies
The Group Armies (GAs) are to incorporate under one commander, a fully 
mechanised formation of infantry (two to four divisions), one or two tank 
divisions plus support units (engineer, transport elements for example) and 
air defence.(150) The tank and motorised-rifle formations are to constitute 
integrated combined-arms teams, and if organised along, or near, Soviet 
lines would include infantry, tank, artillery, anti-tank and anti-chemical 
units (to counter Soviet CW) - under a single commander.(151) To facilitate 
this structural change it is envisaged that thousands of units at 
regimental level and above would be abolished or merged.(152)
Reorganisation had taken place on paper by 1985, but equipping the new 
formations with the latest hardware has slowed the process. To date, only 
three of the planned 22 GA's have been fully equipped.(153) It is envisaged
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that coordinated mobile warfare and positional war will be facilitated by 
the mechanised forces which are to form the combined-arms teams. The 
intention is to meet the Soviet combined forces at the border with a 
similar formation and limit their penetration.(154)
Although caution should be used when evaluating GA composition, it is clear 
that large-scale reorganisation has taken place. Further rationalisation of 
resources (no doubt influenced by economic pressures) has led to the 
transfer of large "parcels" of PLA infrastructure to civilian use, as in 
the defence industries. The merger of the Railway Corps into the Railway 
Ministry and shifting the control of local security troops to a civil 
organisation are but two examples.(155)
(iii) "Regularisation" and the Military Regions
Military region amalgamations quickly followed the above changes, to 
facilitate a coordinated defence. The Regional Army is currently organised 
in 7 Military Regions (MR's) with 29 Military Districts (MD's). In wartime 
the frontier MR's are to become "Fronts" or combine into Strategic 
Sectors.(156) Reorganisation is supposed to ease command centralisation and 
enable the General Staff to coordinate regional forces more 
effectively.(157) The Group (or Integrated) Armies are under a centralised 
command (in contrast to regional forces) but in time of conflict, both are
utilised in the "Fronts".
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TABLE: ESTIMATED GROUP ARMY* DEPLOYMENT
Military Regions GA*
Shenyang (North-East) 4 - estimated 1988/89
Beijing (North) 5
Lanzhou (West) 2
Chengdu (South-West) 3
Guangzhou (South) 3
Jinan (Central) 2
Nanjing (East) 3
Source: The Military Balance, 1989, (London IISS)
The integration of forces into GA's and the reorganisation of Military 
Regions indicate the thrust of current streamlining which aims to maximise 
efficiency. Certainly in the case of the MR amalgamations, the resulting 
cut in administrative infrastructure (including hundreds of senior staff 
officers) is one way to achieve streamlining.(158)
(iii) The Fate of the Militia
The organisation of a Reserve component (not seen since the 1950's) 
continued this trend (embodied in the Military Service Law) of structural 
streamlining and professionalism. The Law specified the categories of 
officers and enlisted personnel eligible for reserve duties. These included 
all officers and enlisted personnel withdrawing from active duty (unless 
for debilitating illness); college graduates that "are made to serve as 
reserve officers'1, and other technical and professional personnel.(159)
The intention would seem to be to create a pool of educated personnel of a 
higher level of military (and technical) training than the often poorly 
trained militia forces that the Reserve is replacing.
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As with other aspects of defence modernisation, reorganisation of militia 
forces has been accompanied by official explanations aimed as much to 
demonstrate the PLA's resolve to meet the conditions of modern warfare, as 
to send clear messages to Party conservatives. The deputy Chief of the PLA 
General Staff (He Zhengwen) was at pains to emphasise that;
"...the future war against aggression 
would be [one in which] the enemy forces, 
forms and ways of operations and the equipment 
used ... would all be quite different 
from the past. It would be too late in such a 
war for the militia to be organised in the 
old way, first by mobilising the people, then 
forming militia ... units, and later upgrading 
them to the level of regular armed forces".(160)
The service is divided into primary and general units with all demobilised 
soldiers under 28 years of age in the former and 18 to 35 year old males 
(without military training) in the second category. This then serves the 
twin goals (it is suggested) of reducing the number of troops in peacetime, 
but creating a broad mobilisation base for use in time of conflict.(161)
The primary function of the militia in this context is not, then, to fight 
alongside the regular forces as envisaged in People's War, but to provide 
the regular forces with manpower as needed.(162)
(iv) Streamlining the Logistics System
Strengthening logistics services is also a goal undertaken in the interests 
of regularisation. Its importance was recognised in official statements 
from 1982 especially, when an all-army logistics conference was held. The 
official line recognises that "...automation, high speed, flexibility and 
complexity [of modern forces and warfare] ... sets ever more arduous and 
complicated tasks in ensuring logistics support".(163)
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Anxious to avoid the repetition of the supply line difficulties of the 
Korean War, the PLA had (by 1984) implemented a"comprehensive logistic 
support system". This consisted of networks covering the supply of 
transport, medicine and health, machine repair, and communications.(164)
The application of computer inventory to the administration of logistics 
services is one current example of the drive to minimise inefficiencies and 
observe financial discipline. Another is the establishment of logistics 
support at headquarters, military region and group army levels, to ensure 
uninterrupted and rapid resupply for joint-service mobile warfare.(165) It 
is hoped that this move would tie logistics support in more closely with 
the Integrated Armies.
The General Logistics Department itself has not escaped streamlining and if 
the current plans for reform are implemented, it will preside over a system 
of factories, research institutions, colleges and hospitals that has been 
"cut by half".(166) While hoping to improve the service that the logistics 
base can provide, it is inevitable that the financial constrains leave a 
trimmed Logistics Command unable to perform all its stated functions. In 
late 1988 the China Daily, reported that from 1989, no new defence 
construction projects would be undertaken. Only smaller projects such as 
barracks for soldiers under battalion level and some family housing would 
be continued in an effort to subordinate this area of logistics work to the 
nation's economic development.(167)
3.3 Ground Forces and Weapons Modernisation
The important issues discussed above all impact in different ways on the 
modernisation of the PLA as a whole and have a greater impact on the light
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infantry-dominated ground forces. The priority assigned to hardware 
modernisation has been shown to be behind that of the broader structural 
reorganisation. Indeed, this fundamental tenet of military modernisation 
has withstood leadership changes and policy shifts, so much so that Joffe 
considers it to be the "wellspring" of China's weapons development 
strategy.(168) Constraints on weapons modernisation do not stop at the 
level of funding and have been shown to result from a mix of financial, 
doctrinal and institutional factors.
Weapons and equipment modernisation deserves to be considered separately 
from the important structural reorganisation that is currently underway. 
Godwin identifies the combat performance of military hardware and this 
issue of reorganisation as providing a fundamental dilemma for the PLA: 
"does its outdated weaponry so restrict its battlefield performance that no 
amount of reorganisation ... will do more than make a marginal increase in 
its combat performance"? (169)
"An Irresistible Trend"
The direction of hardware modernisation for ground forces has been set, and 
it represents a substantial departure from Maoist doctrine. Under Mao, 
ground forces trained as infantry and became proficient in close-quarter 
combat, night-fighting and highly fluid guerilla operations. Logistics 
support consisted of the support of the peasantry and the enemy's discarded 
material. Communications and intelligence also relied on the support, 
carefully garnered by the CCP in the countryside.
By the late 1970's the primary combat power provided by ground forces was 
found in the 136 main force divisions of which 121 were infantry, 12 
armoured and only 3 airborne.(170) Since 1979 however, ground force 
modernisation has made impressive gains within financial constraints that
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have weapons renewal taking the twin forms of incremental upgrades of 
existing platforms and selective foreign component purchases. This 
development has been guided by a commitment to "follow the road to 
mechanised and armoured equipment firmly and unswervingly".(171) This 
commitment is said to be dictated by the "law" that this reform is itself 
compatible with economic development in the following manner.
Such development is said to, firstly, result from advances in science and 
technology which are themselves based on the state of the economy and the 
level of material production. As "this new industrial revolution" advances, 
so too do the opportunities for increasing the Army's level of 
mechanisation.(172) "This is really a revolution of the "post-nuclear era"! 
We should not miss a chance to accelerate the pace of our Army becoming 
mechanised and armoured in this climate".(173) Secondly, the nature of the 
modern battlefield is said to make stronger demands on science and 
technology which, when adapted to the needs of the Army, will cause 
mechanised warfare to move to a higher plane. Beijing assumes that a 
mechanised and armoured force will still form the core of a modernised 
ground force. The combination of various elements in such a force - "will 
naturally enable the whole force to be doubly effective, and thus capable 
of fully adapting to the features of modern warfare, which tends to be 
three-dimensional, combined in nature, in-depth, and omnidirectional".(174)
These developments (towards becoming armoured and mechanised) are also said 
to lead to reforms in the quality of personnel, education and training, 
ways of fighting and military theory. Together these factors, along with 
the simultaneous production of various weapons systems, constitute "an 
irresistible trend" in being able to better cope with modern war.(175)
In order to work within funding constraints, the principle of incremental 
modernisation (of existing platforms) in keeping with the directive to
58
"give full play to the role of existing equipment" is to be followed. It is 
stressed that "We must adopt advanced scientific technology in nationally 
transforming existing equipment".(176) The way is then open for selected 
foreign component purchases to improve existing platforms.
Hardware Improvements within this Framework
The MBT (main battle tank) development programme illustrates the drive to 
improve upon outdated systems in keeping with the theme of moving towards a 
more mechanised and armoured force. Improved versions of the 1950's vintage 
T-54 reflect efforts to upgrade the three major functions of firepower, 
armour and manoeuvrability.
Specifically, added protection has been developed against hits by 
armour-piercing (AP) rounds on the side, an improved gun (105mm) was added 
with Israeli assistance, along with European infra-red and fire-control 
systems. Israel is also said to have provided technology for an 
armour-piercing shell capable of penetrating the frontal armour of a Soviet 
T-72.(177) A current version of the upgrade (T-69/II) is available for 
export with foreign systems. However, against its likely opposition these 
upgrades are still outmanoeuvred, outgunned and have not been produced in 
sufficient numbers to make a difference.(178) Beijing also recognises that 
it cannot devote scarce funds to just one or two types of weapons system or 
platform:
"It can be seen that in modern warfare 
that involves a great variety of weapons, 
a three dimensional battlefield, and the 
combined use of various types of weapons, 
it is lopsided to emphasise the role of a 
single weapon system".(179)
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In keeping with this, other systems have been developed simultaneously with 
the MBT programme. Efforts to mechanise the Group Armies have extended to 
the less technologically - intensive areas of APC, light vehicle and 
transport helicopter manufacture. Offensive systems such as anti-tank 
guided munitions (ATGM's) have been purchased or copied from existing 
Soviet designs to correct glaring weaknesses in the face of a Soviet force 
superiority. Such efforts greatly increase the strike power of the GA's but 
must be seen to be of limited utility if not matched by broader-ranging 
improvements. Other advances for tactical defence include improvements in 
artillery deliverable mines and incremental improvements in the lethality 
of AP shells (made possible with US assistance).(180)
STANO capability (surveillance, target acquisition and night observation) 
coupled to improved communications, has received a boost with a satellite 
surveillance and communications capacity now demonstrated.(181) This is 
important if the PLA is to become more responsive, integrated and 
efficient.(182) Strategic and tactical communications are not entirely 
secure, however, and the capabilities currently demonstrated are all 
susceptible to jamming and monitoring.(183) Signal flags, couriers and 
human reconnaissance must still be utilised until such time as the 
requisite equipment reaches the field. Advances in the Chinese electronics 
industry hold the promise of rapid improvements however as do related 
developments in the space industry. The proven ability to place satellites 
in orbit reliably (and relatively cheaply) is helping China to earn foreign 
exchange, but also to improve the PLA's chances of monitoring any Soviet 
buildup along the frontier.(184)
This raises an important point with respect to hardware modernisation. 
Successful integration of air, air defence, and nuclear forces into a land 
battle "under modern conditions" requires rapid and continuous
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communications along with suitable doctrine and organisation.(185) A great 
deal of funding and development efforts are employed in these areas but 
each must still be said to be (by the end of the 1980's) in a state of 
flux. Despite the slow pace of weapons modernisation, Harlan Jencks 
suggests that the PLA "may have suitable weapons ... before they have the 
doctrine, organisation, and C3I necessary to use them".(186)
While resigned to their priority ranking within the modernisation drive 
(and while being occupied with "non-equipment modernisation") PLA 
commanders are beginning to chafe at the awkward pace of reform.(187) There 
are few signs however, that this feeling is strong enough to directly 
challenge the direction of this reform and its place within overall 
economic modernisation.
3.4 PLAAF - Strengthening for "modern conditions"
Strengthening the firepower, integration and mobility of ground forces is 
indeed a crucial exercise if the PLA is to have the ability to counter an 
invasion by a modern opponent. Planners in Beijing have also had to 
consider the requirements of air cover for their ground forces to better 
enable them to meet an adversary that is not likely to attack without its 
own airpower.
The airforce must be in a position to field the following key platforms, 
and it is a measure of the task ahead for the Chinese that the PLAAF is 
deficient in almost all of them. These include: heavy attack aircraft for 
ground support as well as air superiority aircraft; updated SAM's effective 
against low and fast-flying aircraft; air to air missiles; armed 
helicopters; long-range bombers with penetration capabilities, and an 
effective early warning system (ground/air based).(188) The PLAAF does
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field examples of many of these systems, but their capabilities fall far 
short of those of other regional air forces, let alone those of the 
superpowers.
Early Development
Franz Mogdis considers that the Chinese airforce owed its initial 
development entirely to Soviet military aid and assistance in establishing 
indigenous production lines.(189) As a result it became the most dependent 
of all of the services on the Soviet connection, especially during the 
Korean War when the air arms' capabilities were radically transformed. It 
was then much more vulnerable to the total withdrawal of Soviet assistance 
in 1960 which limited the aircraft industries capacity to innovate beyond 
1950's designs.
By this time however, Beijing had obtained the blueprints and technology to 
enable them to put both the J-5 (MIG-15) and Shenyang J-6 (MIG-19) into 
series production. A medium and light bomber capability was provided by the 
"Hong" series (S and 6 "11-28 "Beagle" and Tu-16 "Badger" respectively) but 
the emphasis was primarily upon strategically-defensive types.(190) This 
led to a priority being placed upon fighter aircraft, as well as radar and 
SAM development. The aircraft industries capabilities were then tested in 
the development of a MIG-19 derivative known as the Q-5 (variously known as 
the Fantan-A, F-6 bis). At the time (late 1960's) it was seen as an 
impressive example of an indigenous design capacity, incorporating a 
redesigned airframe, internal weapons bay and conical nose to house a 
doppler radar. It was to be utilised in a ground support role.
A final example of early fighter aircraft development was the series 
production of a copy of the early model MIG-21 (J-7). Its limited armament
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and equipment was to represent only a small advance over the more 
successfully produced J-6 in operational terms however. Many observers 
considered that the production line had slowed by the late 1960's/early 
1970's.(191) This was partly a reflection of the fact that this aircraft 
was more difficult to produce by the labor-intensive means adopted by the 
Chinese for the fabrication of early 1950's designs.(192)
The Soviet Challenge for China's Air Defences
The air-land battle poses a number of unique problems for the PLAAF. 
Certainly the sheer size of the land mass to be defended presents a 
difficult challenge unlike that posed by the defence of point targets (for 
example). The defensive resources needed to cover the large number of 
military and industrial targets are immense,(193) and yet out of 600 
dispersal airfields only around 150 are suitable for jet aircraft and few 
could sustain effective operations for long.(194) Also, despite the high 
concentration of important targets located in the northeast indicating 
likely goals in a Soviet air attack, there has been a pressing need for a 
more efficient early warning system to define an immediate threat more 
precisely.
Two further aspects affecting air operations over the Sino-Soviet border 
include weather conditions and topography. In the first case, considerable 
variation in weather conditions and the inhibiting nature of winter in 
northern latitudes places strong demands on an air force's ability to 
conduct operations in adverse conditions and at night.(195) A force 
consisting mainly of aircraft built for daylight (in lacking adequate 
radar) and fair weather is likely to be unduly restricted in such 
conditions. The topography of the Sino-Soviet theatre also favours the 
Soviet air forces. Sweetman observes that most major Chinese cities are 
within 60 to 90 minutes flight time from major Soviet or Soviet controlled
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bases in Siberia and Mongolia.(196) As major Soviet Far Eastern cities are 
also close to the frontier, it would seem that both sides would demand 
secure early warning to boost their force's quick reaction.
It is unrealistic to assume that the Chinese could match the forces 
deployed by the Soviet Frontal Aviation (FA), but the improvements made to 
this force's strike-power over recent years illustrate the task ahead for 
the PLAAF. FA provides all the tactical airpower and is the largest arm of 
the Soviet air force in numerical terms.(197) It complements the other 
principal operating arm, long-range Aviation (providing strategic aircraft) 
and the "Air Defence" arm (PVO Strany) which is the worlds largest 
air-defence force.(198) Other separate arms include the Strategic Rocket 
Forces and Naval Aviation.
FA has the role of coordinating offensive operations with Soviet land 
forces and incorporates aircraft that "entirely outclass anything which the 
Chinese can field in significant numbers".(199) High performance fighter 
and attack aircraft have been deployed to the Far East which can carry more 
ordnance for greater distances and deliver it with greater accuracy and 
less chance of interception (due to extensive jamming devices 
carried).(200) These advances are represented in the MIG series "Foxhound", 
"Flogger", "Foxbat" and the Sukhoi "Flanker". Dedicated ground-attack/ 
close-support aircraft are another significant (and recent) addition to the 
FA. The Sukhoi-25 "Frogfoot" (similar in concept to the USAF's A-10A 
"Thunderbolt") could have a useful anti-armour role, especially if deployed 
in concert with the MIL-24 "Hind" helicopter gunship against ground forces 
inadequately supported by their own air cover.(201)
As offensive weapons platforms have improved, Soviet defensive systems 
along the frontier and their OMG's organic air defence systems have made 
the task of halting a Soviet incursion much more difficult. On Soviet
64
territory Moscow can rely upon a fixed and mobile OTH-B (Over-the-Horizon 
backscatter) radar at Nikolayev-an-Amur covering northern China.(202) The 
before-mentioned PVO Strany forces incorporate "more than 5,000 early 
warning and height-finder radars, over 2,500 manned interceptors and some 
50,000 SAMs ... at over 1,000 major missile sites".(203) There is also the 
ground force's own layered defences consisting of medium-range SAMs, radar 
controlled guns and man-portable missiles.
As against a PLAAF 4 or 5: I numerical advantage,(204) Moscow can rely on 
its ease of reinforcement from Western SSR's, general qualitative 
advantage, and the ELINT and reconnaissance advantage. Soviet forces are 
present in sufficient strength to hold their own in local clashes if a 
border-wide conflict emerged. However in the more likely event of their 
being utilised in offensive action on a limited scale (a punitive raid or 
to seize territory for bargaining purposes) (205), Soviet air power would 
have the consistent advantage of "engagement control" thus wearing away at 
China's numbers and reducing her ground forces vital close support air 
cover.
PLAAF Roles for "Modern Conditions"
A principal indicator of the air force's efforts to fight a war under 
"modern conditions" is its ability to coordinate with ground forces in the 
new Group Army (combined service) formations. "Coordination" refers to the 
support of ground forces via the provision of aerial reconnaissance, 
battlefield interdiction, localised air superiority, close air support and 
early warning.(206) The improved mobility of ground forces is likely to 
become irrelevant if they cannot rely on this support.
Godwin suggests that the PLAAF could be optimised for this role by 
reorganising along the line of Soviet Frontal Aviation.(207) An "Air Army"
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consisting of three divisions of approximately 100 aircraft could be formed 
to support The Army Group thereby creating a composite force.(208)
Secondly, ground-based air defence could be merged with the new Group Army 
formations, although remaining under airforce control. There is some 
evidence that this is being done.(209) As for the elderly bomber force, the 
task of carrying out offensive operations beyond the range of tactical 
aircraft can be envisaged. However, strategic bombing's emphasis on very 
high altitude or low altitude missions coupled to high speeds and endurance 
are beyond the current force's capabilities. A useful role could be found 
for these Tu-16 and 11-28 copies, as weapons platforms for stand-off 
missiles thus enabling them to attack beyond the range of local 
ground-based air defences.(210)
Military airlift is also required, to complement tactical and long-range 
aircraft and ground defences in a composite force. Some 420 transport 
aircraft are available along with a sizeable civil fleet incorporating a 
mixture of Soviet and American designs.(211) Reorganisation of these 
resources under a Military Air Transport Command under Group Army direction 
is feasible, but would require an increase in the number of aircraft and in 
their capabilities (212) - (payload, range, strengthening for heavy 
military loads etc).
There are then a number of requirements to fulfil if the PLAAF is to become 
linked to its ground forces to provide an adequate defence of continental 
China. Coordination of available resources into Frontal Aviation,
Long-Range forces, Ground Defence and Military Airlift units provides a 
preliminary force structure. This in turn "provides the basis for a 
transition from strategies based upon concepts of people's war to 
strategies in which combined arms forces are structured to increase the 
combat effectiveness of available units".(213)
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Hardware Improvements within this framework
The Chinese have made strenuous efforts to overcome defects in its air 
defence inventory. In the area of high speed fighters, Beijing has opted 
for selected foreign component purchases in what must be seen as the 
"quick-fix" option. F-7 (MIG-21) upgrades are a case in point.
The export version (F-7M "Airguard") has had incorporated into its avionics 
suite, a Western-made head-up display, weapons-aiming computer system, air 
data computer and a new radar. The Chinese have been busy redeveloping the 
engine to produce more thrust and improving the primary armament (a single 
cannon) but so far only a limited number have been deployed compared with 
the MIG-19 derivative.(214) The number of improved versions actually 
available to the PLAAF is probably limited, in that arms sales for foreign 
exchange have a high priority. There have also been efforts to move beyond 
what are essentially 1950's based designs.
The F-8 "Finback", a Mach 2.3 multi-role supersonic interceptor is 
apparently based on the Soviet MIG-23 and will represent a significant 
advance in China's air defence capabilities if they can be produced in any 
quantity. It is said to require a new engine before its performance can 
begin to approach that of current Western interceptors,(215) and has been 
under intense development as well a the subject of a US $550 million 
avionics update along the lines noted above. While it has been suggested 
that these efforts will make the F-8 fully the equal of the MIG-23 (216), 
there is the problem of the update being based upon an aircraft supplied by 
Egypt which in itself was a downgraded export version.(217) The F-8 would 
also have to deal with more capable Soviet aircraft (developed since the 
first roll-out of the "Flogger" series) and now operational in the Far
East.
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Similar problems are encountered among ground attack forces represented by 
the Q-5 "Fantan". This aircraft's limited radar suite means that it can 
only deliver its ordnance "in a diving attack from medium altitude against 
a target that has already been visually identified and located on a first 
pass".(218) Efforts to improve this aircrafts chances of success and 
survival have led designers to again seek foreign assistance. In this case, 
an Italian company (Aeritalia's electronics division) has provided new 
electronic navigation and fire-control systems, to produce a new export 
version (A-5M) which had its maiden flight in August of 1988.(219)
Until these can be produced in useful quantities, the F-6 and Q-5 will have 
to suffice as the backbone of the PLAAF's tactical force. They will 
continue to be outclassed by Soviet tactical aircraft with the performance 
to rule out any attempt to force them into an engagement.(220)
No armed helicopters have been reported to date,(221) although recent 
reports clearly suggest that elements within the PLA see these platforms as 
an essential addition to a combined formation's inventory. The view that 
"Crawling on the ground will soon become history ... future battlefields 
will be dominated by helicopters" (222) has to compete with the official 
line stating that, "the era of using a single weapon system, or letting a 
single arm dominate the battlefield, is gone".(223)
An upgraded B-6 (Hong - 6/Tu-16) now has a greater strike potential with 
the addition of C-601 anti-ship ALCM's. This aircraft equips both the PLAAF 
and Naval Aviation and with the addition of in-flight refuelling will 
extend Chinese aircover markedly,(224) which will undoubtedly give some 
regional countries cause for concern if tensions over the Spratly Islands
increase.
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Two final (and related) issues involve ground-based air defence and EW 
radar. The CSA-1 is the only SAM in Chinese service (a copy of the SA-2 
"Guideline") and equips 28 Air Defence regiments.(225) It lacks mobility so 
would be unavailable to cover the more mechanised of the upgraded ground 
forces at short notice. It is also susceptible to jamming. While this 
weapon still equips the PLAAF, advances have been made in EW with a new 
domestically made radar network which can cover the whole territorial air 
space of the country. It is deemed to be a well organised warning system 
"close to advanced level in major areas of technology".(226)
Considerable efforts have then been made to improve not only the PLAAF's 
technological base but the force's organisation and coordination with 
ground forces. Selective use of foreign technology and expertise have 
allowed rapid advances but it is clear that these changes need to be made 
on a broader scale to shake off the technologically backward legacy of the 
PLAAF's first thirty years.
3.5 Naval Forces: New Doctrine, New Role
People's War was a doctrine formulated primarily for ground forces. Field 
Army Commanders having experienced success with guerilla and mobile warfare 
against the Japanese and Nationalist forces were, for the most part, 
unconvinced as to the Navy's contribution to national security.(227) The 
development of the PLAN as a coastal extension of the ground forces 
followed from this view, but was reinforced by the vigorous application of 
People's War at sea as noted in the first chapter.
Precursors to a New Doctrine
The "changing of the guard" in the political arena is, of course, directly 
related to the PLA's changing role and force structure. In relation to the
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naval forces, there was a perception of a sharper Soviet threat, and not 
one that consisted exclusively of missile, air and ground forces. The 
growing threat posed by the Soviet Pacific Fleet, illustrated clearly by 
the massive naval exercise "Okean 75", enhanced Chinese fears of 
encirclement.(228)
In two key indicators of naval capabilities - quantity and quality of 
hardware and operational open ocean experience - (229) the Soviet Pacific 
Fleet is well ahead of the coastal-oriented PLAN. These general 
deficiencies are perhaps less of a problem for the Chinese if they are 
content to retain the coastal defence orientation held previously. There 
are a number of factors however that have merged beyond the threat posed by 
the Soviet Navy, and which have acted to create a need for naval forces 
with a greater reach.
The 1970's brought a clearer perception of the path ahead for China's 
overall economic modernisation. Part of this was some recognition of the 
importance of coastal and offshore development. A greater emphasis on 
maritime trade has led to a "sea control" requirement (protecting sea lines 
of communications (SLOC's) and one of "sea denial" (denying certain sea 
areas to enemy naval power).(230)
Beijing's "realisation" that its national interests did not end at its 
shoreline led to participation in the protracted UN Law of the Sea 
negotiations from 1973 to 1982. Beijing's participation in the important 
questions of exclusive economic zones (EEZs), free passage of shipping and 
the limits of territorial waters illustrated the renewed salience of 
maritime foreign relations for the Chinese.(231) Commercial factors also 
highlighted the growing importance of maritime affairs in China's 
modernisation. The growth of the country's merchant marine threw the sea
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control requirement into sharper relief. The 1970's saw the purchase or 
construction of ten million dead-weight tons of shipping for the domestic 
and international market, and a subsequent growth in maritime trade.(232)
The exploitation of oil and gas reserves beyond a country's EEZ was also 
raised during the negotiations. China's stance on exploiting resources 
along her continental shelf from the Gulf of Bohai to the South China Sea 
quickly brought her into conflict with her regional neighbours however. The 
question of sovereignty over the Japanese administered Senkaku Islands, the 
Paracel Is. group, and the Spratly Is. group became intertwined with the 
issue of resources exploitation.(233)
A Greater Regional Role
Statements issued from 1977 illustrated that a navy with a longer reach, 
could have a role in retaining and/or returning Chinese control to certain 
irredentist territories.(234) Taiwan was often mentioned in this context. 
Amphibious landing exercises were conducted in the Taiwan Strait area in 
1976 but Beijing has been careful to alternate the carrot with the stick 
and now stresses peaceful unification.(235) A more complex example of a 
territorial dispute are the competing claims over the ownership of the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands. It illustrates the extent to which Beijing 
wishes to expand her naval presence in East Asia.(236)
Although having to contend with Vietnamese and Taiwanese claims of 
ownership, the Chinese are now firmly entrenched in the Paracel group which 
was seized by amphibious forces in 1974.(237) 1988 saw Chinese forces 
secure their first permanent foothold in the Spratly Island group after a 
brief battle with Vietnamese troops. Naval and land forces have since 
consolidated this gain. This follows from an earlier operation where naval
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forces conducted a "double-pronged show of force" around the 150 scattered 
atolls and reefs that make up this Southern Island group.(238) This was a 
significant exercise in naval presence and force projection. The former 
being defined as the employment of maritime power "to convey messages of 
resolve, concern, or support". In this case it was a demonstration of 
resolve, and a challenge to Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and the Philippines 
who all claim the island group in whole or in part.
The capabilities demonstrated still serve to highlight a number of areas in 
which the PLAN remains deficient despite recent advances. Economic 
imperatives have combined with military capabilities to drive China in the 
direction of becoming the major naval force in the China Seas but available 
technology still constrains the PLAN. Vast improvements are needed if 
Beijing wishes to be in a position to deny regional waters to the Soviet 
Union in time of war.(239) Even further improvements in weapons and 
equipment, as well as open ocean experience, are vital if the PLAN is to 
attain a sustained power projection capability at sea.
Weapons and Equipment: Towards a "Blue Water" capability?
Until recently, there was considerable evidence to suggest that Chinese 
navy's operational reach justified the tag of having "a very short 
tether".(240) This was an assessment not totally reversed by the, 
admittedly impressive, exercises in force projection and co-ordination 
mentioned above.
Static measurements show the PLAN still influenced by its long-standing 
coastal orientation. Beijing can still count on the largest small-ship 
force (missile, torpedo and patrol craft), deployed by any navy. An 
impressive number of diesel electric submarines are well suited to coastal
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operations but apart from five nuclear submarines (Han and Xia class), the 
PLAN'S sub-surface reach is limited. It is true that the older Whisky and 
Romeo-class derivatives are capable of deploying beyond the immediate 
coastal environs (2,300 nm and 1,800 nm range respectively) (241) which 
means a presence in adjacent seas. However the vulnerability of these units 
to ASW detection must be taken into account. Also their service-ability 
must be called into question. Of the 84 Romeo and 20 Whisky class listed, 
only half of each are said to be fully operational.(242)
The PLAN'S principal surface combatants are, all destroyer and 
frigate-sized units. Their key weaknesses are variously described as 
outdated sensors (sonar, radar), limited air defences (a lack of 
radar-directed guns and missiles) and poor weaponry (there is a need for 
rapid firing and auto loading guns especially). The Soviet legacy features 
here, (as it has been demonstrated to in the ground and air forces). With 
few exceptions the PLAN'S platforms, weapons and sensors are copies or 
variants of thirty-year old Soviet systems.(243) Daniel notes that this is 
the case -
"with 95 percent of the PRC's submarines,
32 percent of its major surface combatants,
30 percent of its patrol craft, all of its 
mine warfare vessels, approximately 96 percent 
of its tactical strike aircraft, nearly all of 
its radar and IFF ... systems, and all of its 
operational ASUW cruise missiles".(244)
Hardware improvements have been made however, by way of selected foreign 
purchases and indigenous design efforts. Some new frigates are now being 
equipped with Exocet-type ship-to-ship missiles,(245) and US-built LM2500 
turbine engines are to equip a new class of destroyer.(246) The French have 
also supplied 100mm gun mounts, fire direction systems and the Dauphin 
helicopter that will equip the new Wuhan class ships.(247) A Chinese
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developed 3D phased array air search radar was also spotted as early as 
1983,(248) and there are suggestions that satellite communications are used 
to co-ordinate long range exercises.(249)
These are not insignificant advances. They need to be taken into account as 
evidence of the seriousness with which the Chinese regard the expanding 
role of their naval forces. Certainly, the improvements made in the 
amphibious "troop strike" category are significant in a regional context. 
Also the greater ability of the PLAN'S escort vessels to provide for their 
own air defence means that there is less reliance on limited-range 
land-based air cover. Current moves to incorporate an in-flight refuelling 
capability for tactical aircraft would also help to alleviate this 
problem.(250)
At this point, the Chinese have laid useful foundations, upon which they 
can build a more capable regional navy with a limited blue-water 
capability. Budgetary constraints however, have caught up with the PLAN as 
they have with the other services.(251) While incremental upgrades are 
evident, the Soviet Pacific Fleet based at Vladivostok and Cam Ranh Bay (as 
well as the Vietnamese naval forces), continues to improve in quality, and 
augment its numbers (currently at 73 principal surface combatants and 112 
submarines).(252)
While PLAN capabilities improve slowly, the regional reaction to Beijing's 
greater predilection to flex its ocean-going muscle in support of foreign 
policy objectives is likely to be negative. The Paracel and Spratly Islands 
were used as an example of competing national interest in the China Seas. 
Greater power projection, sea control and sea denial capabilities 
demonstrated by any nation will gain the attention of competing 
parties in this instance. It is the navy's potential, even with funding 
constraints, that will continue as an important issue in this context.
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3.6 The Nuclear Deterrent and "Modern Conditions"
Many observers begin their analyses of China's nuclear forces and policies 
with a number of warnings. These centre on the difficulty of obtaining a 
clear picture in the face of Chinese secrecy. Information that is available 
is often from vague and scattered sources designed for public consumption 
and, as a result, less is known about the PRC's nuclear forces and strategy 
than about those of the other nuclear weapons powers. This is a problem 
that can be compounded by ethnocentrism in strategic analysis - that is, a 
tendency to interpret Chinese nuclear policies in terms of Western 
strategic thought.(253)
To overcome this tendency, Segal suggests that one needs to concentrate on 
Chinese threat perceptions and the inter-related influences of geography, 
ideology and political institutional guidance. The analysis in the section 
below is involved in identifying these sources of Chinese nuclear doctrine, 
which acted to influence the development of nuclear forces in the 1960's. 
The Maoist influence is significant still, but it must also be recognised, 
that the downgrading of 'People's War' in defence calculations, has had its 
own impact.
Early Nuclear Deterrent Development
In examining the beginnings of the Chinese nuclear deterrent during the 
domestic turmoil of the mid-to-late 1960's the observer needs to take care 
to separate declaratory policy from deeper motivations/influences. Those 
statements that became available, were limited to official communiques 
following the early tests (the so called "detonation statements") as they 
do provide a useful record of distinct trends in policy. It is useful to 
remember, however, that Chinese nuclear strategy has complex origins which
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demand a closer look at both the sources of strategy and other constraints 
and motivations that influence declaratory statements.
Key Sources of China's Nuclear Strategy
Segal identifies some of the main sources of Chinese nuclear strategy which 
together provide at least a basis from which to approach early Chinese 
attitudes to nuclear weapons.(254)
The geography (physical and human) of China, reveals the world’s largest 
population, a less industrialised economy than those of the superpowers, 
long sea and land frontiers and a related perception of encirclement.(255) 
These factors combine to give China "less cause to be concerned with a 
general invasion of its territory or vulnerability to nuclear war".(256) 
This is due mainly to the perception that the Chinese people are unlikely 
to be entirely destroyed as a race in a nuclear exchange; that their 
agrarian-based economy is less inter-dependent than those of the 
superpowers and thus less vulnerable to an attack; and that her northern 
boundaries provide a degree of natural protection. Caution is reguired in 
building an analysis on such factors but geographic realities are surely 
relevant to calculations of threat and cannot be ignored. These factors can 
be seen to be at work in early Chinese pronouncements on the likely future 
of nuclear weapons in an attack on the People's Republic-intertwined with 
the influence of ideology.
Ideological factors have a role also. Certainly this is so in relation to 
the belief in the inevitability of conflict war between capitalism and 
communism, the "paper tiger" concept (of nuclear weapons in the hands of 
the superpowers), and the belief in the absence of a dividing line between 
nuclear and conventional war.(257) In this last case, any combat is seen as
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a continuation of the drive to further communism, only controlled "when the 
social structure of states are transformed towards communism".(258) The 
political direction provided behind attitudes towards nuclear weapons is 
central, considering that the military as an institution has far less 
control over nuclear strategy in China than in the Soviet Union (for 
example).
Some of the declaratory statements emerging from Beijing when China began 
to demonstrate publicly her offensive nuclear capabilities, can be 
considered in the context of these background sources.
Early Chinese Attitudes Towards Nuclear Weaponry
A number of important themes emerge from the early official communiques and 
can be discerned on two levels. Firstly there is the level of declaratory 
policies both for international and domestic consumption. Themes evident 
here included, the development of Chinese nuclear weapons as a vindication 
of Mao's thought, a consistent No-First-Use (NFU) pledge; a reluctance to 
engage in the political use of nuclear weapons, and an emphasis on the need 
for unimpeded R&D in this area.(259)
Vindication of Mao's thought was often reported as behind the R&D 
successes; "Inspired by Chairman Mao's teaching. It has taken China only 
two years and eight months to cover the entire course from her first A-bomb 
explosion .... to the successful H-bomb test".(260) Pollack considers that 
such statements as these are more a reflection of political in-fighting 
than a genuine transformation in Maoist attitudes.(261) Despite this the 
programme was sheltered from Cultural Revolution turmoil and was the 
recipient of large sums that were continually diverted from conventional 
force development after 1960.(262) According to Pollack:
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"...Modernisation of Peking's national defence 
capabilities emerged as a sufficiently critical 
commitment to take precedence over issues of 
internal political conflict or resource 
distribution".(263)
On a general level the importance of the programme was ascribed to the 
threat of "nuclear encirclement" or "blackmail". Firstly the US, then the 
Soviet Union were cast in the roles of allies in an "anti-China conspiracy, 
necessitating a Chinese response in defence. A superpower conspiracy theme 
was important in that it supposedly demonstrated that China's nuclear 
acquisition was fundamentally different from that of the superpowers in not 
representing a "tool of aggression".
The "defensive" nature of China's nuclear weapons was also to be 
demonstrated by the NFU pledge. At this level of public consumption at 
least, such a pledge is useful in that it has supported China's claim that 
her nuclear weapons development was initiated to break a superpower 
monopoly.(264) It tied in with the claims found in the first "detonation 
statement",
"On the question of nuclear weapons, China 
will never commit the error of adventurism 
nor the error of capitulationism. The 
Chinese people can be trusted".(265)
Accusations of "adventurism" and "capitulationism" were levelled at the 
Soviet Union after the Cuban missile crisis and seemed to indicate an 
unwillingness to sanction the use of nuclear weapons "as a resource for 
foreign policy manoeuvres".(266) Official statements along these lines 
often drew on the ideological dictum "Despise the enemy strategically, take 
him seriously tactically" as well as providing a backdrop to that assurance 
- "The Chinese people can be trusted".
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Finally, one of the more persistent themes to emerge during the 1960's was 
that a Chinese response to nuclear attack (if deterrence failed) would 
continue to utilise the guerilla war concepts of People's War. Nuclear 
deterrence as supplemental to conventional deterrence could have both 
reflected a resurgence of Maoism during the Cultural Revolution and a 
Chinese nuclear inferiority. In 1960 Lin Piao had announced that -
"To deal with a missile or nuclear war, 
the most important thing for us to do 
is to mobilise and rely on the people 
to carry out People's War".(267)
It came to be stressed repeatedly, that for an enemy to hope to subjugate 
China a nuclear strike would be insufficient for victory which is said to 
reguire an army, regular weapons and occupation.(268) A "bolt-out-of-the- 
blue" attack, followed by land invasion could be met by corps, regional and 
militia forces that would be in a position to coordinate a protracted war. 
The prospect of becoming bogged down in such a conflict was supposed to 
provide the deterrent.
Motivations and Constraints
It is important to recognise however, that behind the declaratory policy 
and continued outward reliance on People's War, Beijing was fully aware of 
the significance of nuclear weaponry. In particular the impact that these 
weapons could have on the foreign policy behaviour of the superpowers, 
China's regional neighbours and those non-aligned nations further afield, 
placed some constraints on Beijing.
The NFU pledges; reluctance to use these weapons for political leverage; 
assurances of "anti adventurism" - all illustrate an awareness of
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superpower superiority, and of the sensibilities of regional and 
extra-regional states. China realised that her nuclear R&D programme could 
have contributed to a situation where certain regional powers may have felt 
threatened. Her response was to repeat China's perception of "nuclear 
encirclement" to justify both the acquisition of these weapons and the 
official emphasis on their limited utility in any confrontation involving 
China (269) By the end of the 1960's China could only boast a very limited 
nuclear retaliatory capacity and as a result stressed the deterrent 
function of a single detonation, with only vague references to retaliatory 
scenarios.(270)
Having to operate in conditions of marked inferiority Beijing was 
apparently at pains to adopt a very low-key approach towards its nuclear 
arsenal and questions of its use. A strategically defensive posture was 
evident in statements from 1961 - 1969. The 1961 evaluation of nuclear 
weapons that "The final conclusion thus rests on man ... We have to avoid 
the strengths and take advantage of the weaknesses of the enemy",(271) and 
the 1969 statement "It is imperative to put Mao Tse-tung Thought in command 
and ... master skills in close-range and night-fighting...",(272) - support 
this conclusion.
Research and development (of nuclear weaponry) was obviously not dismissed 
as it continued steadily throughout this period. However, until a secure 
retaliatory force could be mustered the constraints on China's foreign 
policy behaviour were still influential. The reliance on the deterrence of 
a single detonation could then shift to the formulation of concrete 
retaliatory scenarios, which were not an available option to planners in 
the 1960's. Even then Beijing had to tread cautiously as the time was not 
right for radical changes in nuclear doctrine. Jonathan Pollack notes (on
this score),
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"As...noted earlier, the circumstances 
under which substantive change in the 
Chinese nuclear doctrine might occur can 
only be when China's military vulnerability 
is perceived by decision makers as 
gualitatively lessened and when Chinese 
security from nuclear attack is far more 
assured".(273)
These issues remain problematic.
Deterrence Concepts - Some Changes.
From the first nuclear test the Chinese have relied on a mix of deterrence 
by denial as well as retaliation. Joffe's observation that the relative 
weight of these two elements has shifted over time, is tied directly to the 
fluctuating influence of People's War.(274) Deterring an attack by denying 
victory to an opponent (and raising the cost of any victory) is an, 
essentially, strategically defensive posture to adopt. It ties in with 
the strategic defensive of 'People's War' and has the effect of directing 
planner's attention to other defensive programmes, such as passive civil 
defence and air defence.(275) It has been suggested that even the offensive 
tier (nuclear weaponry) of this denial strategy can be said to reveal a 
defensive orientation in being dwarfed by the superpowers in both a 
guantitative and gualitative sense.(276)
Confusion also surrounds assessments as to the degree of reliance placed by 
the Chinese on deterrence by retaliation. Although, explicit threats of 
retaliation do not fit with a strategically defensive denial posture, this 
is not to say that the capability to retaliate has not been deemed to be an 
important one. Joffe considers that a war-fighting capacity became more 
important after China acquired an offensive nuclear capability, which in
81
turn raised a number of important issues such as survivability and 
accuracy, related to the issue of second strike forces.(277)
Another important (and related) aspect of Chinese nuclear deterrence, is 
the lack of a requirement for massive numbers in any category of offensive 
nuclear weaponry.(278) If there is a widespread tendency among Western 
analysts (on this topic) it is to ascribe a "minimum deterrence" posture to 
China's quantitative and qualitative inferiority (relative to the 
superpowers). The discussion in chapter one illustrated the impact of 
geography, ideology and institutional pressure on this deterrence strategy. 
It is worth nothing however that Chinese leaders seem to reject the key 
assumptions underlying "minimal deterrence". Among these special criticism 
is reserved for the idea of a limited nuclear counter attack deterring a 
stronger nuclear power.(279) Again, like so many official pronouncements on 
defence issues and especially on nuclear deterrence issues this does little 
to dispel the uncertainty surrounding Beijing's outlook.
Indeed, ambiguity offers distinct advantages. It introduces a measure of 
flexibility and does not lock planners into any set path in the development 
of their nuclear forces.(280)
The policy of "calculated ambiguity" has had particular value for a power 
like China that has attempted to build an effective deterrent against 
vastly superior opponents.(281 ) It has also contributed to an on-going 
internal debate that, according to Fieldhouse, has yet to be resolved 
between nuclear 'minimalists' and those who regard the current force 
structure as an inadequate deterrent (especially in a limited war).(282) 
This poses a particular problem for an observer wishing to plot a "probable 
course" for China's nuclear forces in the long-term.
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A Force Structure for "Modern Conditions”.
Taking ambiguity in policy as given, it is still possible however to 
observe a sustained effort to improve the nuclear forces retaliatory 
capability. Indications of this include force structure improvements 
(especially survivability of weapons and equipment) which in the face of 
vague official statements, serve as evidence of the priority placed on the 
nuclear deterrent. As "People's War" had the effect of adding weight to 
deterrence by denial, so a shift from this overall doctrine has had the 
effect of placing a greater reliance on a war-fighting/retaliatory 
capacity.(283) The nuclear forces have always received a constant level of 
funding, the difference in evidence currently is that this funding is being 
utilised in such a fashion as to alter the "range" of deterrence. That is, 
the questions 'How much is enough’ and 'which types of weapon', are being 
reassessed and nuclear weapons are playing a greater role in positional 
defence at the frontier as well as being able to retaliate beyond the 
immediate theatre of war, or the region for that matter.
Without a secure retaliatory capacity, the credibility of China's nuclear 
deterrent must remain in some doubt, despite the advantages of 
ambiguity.(284) The requirements of survivability remain true for any 
country's nuclear forces. China is no exception to the rule, but has 
further to go to ensure that her offensive nuclear systems can co-ordinate 
retaliatory action. These requirements include dispersal, camouflage and 
hardening of land-based missile sites along with some consideration of 
alternative basing modes (for example rail and road mobility). A sea-based 
deterrent (sub surface) and long-range strike aircraft capable of a quick 
reaction to warnings of attack (and able to penetrate an opponent's 
airspace) all provide a retaliatory capability and varying degrees of 
survivability. When coupled to a secure and efficient C3I network, there 
emerges a force better equipped to retaliate with reasonable success.
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(i) Missiles
China's nuclear force structure has long been made up of a wide range of 
forces, although quantitative and qualitative limits feature in each 
category. A relatively small arsenal in terms of warheads (285) is 
structured in a triad of land-based missiles, bombers, and submarine- 
launched missiles. Tactical nuclear weaponry also features - a factor that 
will be referred to below. The majority of the land missile force is in the 
medium to intermediate range category although the former comprises the 
CSS-1 (286) which may now be slated for retirement. Of the remainder, there 
is the CSS-2 intermediate-range (2,500 km) incorporating an indigenous 
design, single stage, storable liquid system. Modified variants boast solid 
fuel, MIRV ing and refire capability (287) and have been deployed on mobile 
launchers to lessen vulnerability to a surprise first strike.
There have been varied reports of up to three ICBM types (CSS - 3, 4, 5) 
incorporating multiple warheads and in the case of the CSS4 and 5, a MIRV 
capacity.(288) The CSS-3 is, strictly speaking, a 'limited range ICBM' 
(7,000km) but represented a development milestone in being both the first 
missile to be deployed in hardened silos and a precursor to a full-range 
ICBM.(289) The first true ICBM range missiles capable of hitting any target 
in the Soviet Union and North America deployed by China are the 12,000 km 
range CSS4 and the CSS-S (extended range).(290) While these are significant 
advances, their limited production (there are only 6 ICBM range missiles 
according to the 11SS) (291) would seem to suggest that the requirements of 
survivability have made a sub-surface deterrent a more attractive use of
limited funds.
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(ii) Submarines
Representing perhaps the most promising nuclear R&D programme in terms of 
secure second-strike forces, the SLBM/SSBN programme has also been the most 
difficult (and conseguently slow moving). The Xia class (Daqingya in China) 
launch platform was the first purpose designed SSBN to enter service with 
the PLAN.(292) So far only one is operational, but it carries 12 CSS-N-3 
SLBM's (each with one 2MT warhead) which was test-fired in 1982 from the 
navy's single (conventionally powered) Golf Class SSBN.(293) The lengthy 
development period was a result of design problems in the boat's nuclear 
propulsion system and delays in developing a reliable solid fuel for the 
SLBM.
Problems in sufficiently hardening land-based missile silos, and the 
'theatre-only' range of the majority of them (fixed or mobile) are both 
factors making SLBM's a more attractive option.(294)
Further problems slowing their deployment and operational efficiency 
include technical deficiencies in ocean mapping, navigation equipment and 
training, and silent running.(295)
(iii) Bombers
The greater utility of submarines and the more recent land-based nuclear 
weaponry in providing a secure second strike force would seem to mitigate 
against further development of the bomber fleet. This does not mean that 
R&D on strategic bombers has halted (there were reports in 1985 of the 
commencement of a new design),(296) but the fleet in existence still 
suffers from either limited range or weak penetration capabilities. The 
primary nuclear bombers (Tu-16 Badger/Hong-6 and IL-28 Beagle/H5) are both
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of 1950's vintage and require jet-capable airfields that are easy targets 
A tactical air power role (for nuclear weapons) is said to be provided by 
the Qiang-5 and F9 aircraft, but again the limited ranges of these are a 
problem as is the Q-5's reported inability to carry out an attack on the 
first pass with conventional weaponry.
(iv) Tactical Nuclear Weapons & Significance
The recent introduction of Tactical Nuclear Weaponry (TNW) represented a 
significant change in Chinese nuclear doctrine with the paucity of such 
weapons perhaps linked to Maoist strategies emphasis on "drawing in deep" 
and "hugging" the enemy.
TNW's include: nuclear artillery shells, short-range ballistic missiles 
(SRBM's) and atomic demolition munitions (ADM's). ADM's and other 
prepositioned low-yield devices are used to slow an enemy's advance by 
blocking access over geo-strategic land routes connecting the Manchurian, 
Beijing and Shanghai regions.(297) As such they illustrate the positional 
war emphasis of PWUMC. TNW's also introduce a greater element of 
flexibility. Problems with the accuracy of the missile force has led to a 
situation where the force could only employ counter-value strikes (against 
large population and industrial centres). Such a response to a limited 
attack for example would result in large scale retaliation that China could 
not match.(298) TNW's serve to enhance flexibility by representing a 
response commensurate with a limited attack and by enhancing defensive 
capabilities against an invading force.(299)
Finally the incorporation of existing missile units (of the Second 
Artillery) into the new Strategic Missile Wing may have been influenced by 
the added responsibilities "stemming from the projected use of tactical
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nuclear weapons".(300) The new organisations responsibilities are not 
limited to strategic weaponry. It was implied upon the establishment of the 
wing that "rapid advances in military technology had made it necessary for 
the PLA to raise its combined attacking ability. Only in this way would it 
be able to win battles".(301) The deployment of these weapons reinforces 
the departure from Maoist precepts by assuming that the type of war the PLA 
is most likely to face will be of a limited nature, not preceded by a 
massive nuclear attack.
Doctrinal change has had (and is continuing to have) a wide-ranging impact 
on both organisational and equipment areas of the PLA's modernisation 
programme. Each of the services, as well as the arms/departments within the 
services, have a role to play in ensuring the continued momentum of the 
modernisation drive within the combined constraints of funding cuts, 
technical deficiencies and foreign perceptions of threat. What should be 
evident, is that planners in Beijing are directing their attention to the 
key issues - from defence industries (and problems of vertical 
integration), to the PLAN'S amphibious troop lift capacity and the standard 
of the ground force's firepower and armour protection. Each provide their 
own potential obstacles to military modernisation.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis opened with the observation that a shift in security outlook 
has been accompanied by the realisation among the Chinese leadership, that 
longer term economic modernisation would influence all attempts to 
modernise the armed forces. In their attempts to modernise within this 
constraint there has been a considerable development of the PLA's war - 
fighting capabilities with a focus upon hardware improvements (including 
technological strengthening), the human element (in an emphasis on 
professionalism and modern training), and the guiding role of a revised 
military doctrine. These advances are likely to continue to influence the 
course of China's on-going efforts to modernise its armed forces.
With the realisation that China cannot afford to rely exclusively on 
external sources to improve the PLA's technological base, have come efforts 
to strengthen the military by a balanced intake of foreign technology and 
domestic research and development. This pragmatism is reflected in 
Beijing's efforts to improve the country's own defence-industrial base to, 
as much as possible, facilitate an independent posture. On the ground, the 
PLA has had to meet the challenge of improving its capabilities within the 
constraints imposed by outdated weaponry. This challenge is approached via 
a commitment to the support of a force structure composed of equipment 
which, along with the training required to operate it, represents a 
substantial departure from Maoist doctrine. In the air, the PLAAF has not 
only been the subject of specific equipment upgrades, but it has been set 
the task of coordinating its units with that of the other arms of the PLA. 
This coordination itself represents a departure from the previous doctrine. 
At sea, the PLAN'S development has had a not inconsiderable impact on (and 
is bound up with) Beijing's desire to play a greater regional role. 
Subsequent advances will reinforce the navy's ability to deploy a force in
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the open ocean for extended periods and in doing so the PLAN will become a 
true "blue water" force despite current budgetary constraints common to the 
other service arms. Similarly, China’s strategic and tactical nuclear 
force has developed to the point where their potential employment must 
surely add to the significant deterrent of combined arms operations. The 
"calculated ambiguity" inherent in China's possession of this nuclear 
capability, then comes from the uncertainty an aggressor must face over 
whether Beijing will contemplate their use for frontier defence or for 
retaliation over the border.
Behind the advances in hardware terms, the analysis has also considered the 
role of reserve and militia forces, the improvement of which aids the 
leadership's efforts to trim overall numbers in the PLA. This has allowed 
the military to match smaller standing forces with improved technology to 
meet the goal of a leaner more modern fighting force.
Supporting the visible eguipment upgrades, the central task of professional 
training has been argued to have been seriously addressed by the Chinese. 
This is reflected in the growth in the size and stature of the military 
academy system and moves to ease the high numbers of geriatric high and 
middle level cadres, out of the PLA.
This evolving force structure is now tasked with the protection of national 
interests into the next century, within the guiding framework of a shift in 
military doctrine. The essence of people's War is retained with the new 
doctrine ("People's War Under Modern Conditions") still emphasising the 
importance of the human element as well as the utility of grinding an enemy 
advance to a stalemate. However the impact of "modern conditions" can also 
be traced. An acceptance of these modern conditions has lead to the 
emphasis on active defence which, by stressing positional warfare and the
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protection of civil and industrial infrastructure, recognises the need for 
a different approach to national defence than that offered by the Maoist 
doctrine. The combined arms formation is the instrument to be used within 
the new Military Region formations whose amalgamation had aided the 
coordination of the armed forces. In this way, small-scale guerilla 
operations no longer form the cornerstone of defence doctrine although they 
continue to have an important role in stalling a Soviet penetration (still 
seen as the most likely land-borne threat).
The extent and nature of the requirements of the defence improvement 
process is such that is unlikely, within the current climate of the "Four 
Modernisations", to override broader economic modernisation. However as 
can be seen, the PLA will be in a position to directly benefit from a 
defence and related infrastructure that will allow significant "spin-off" 
benefits to be derived.
This thesis has argued that the extent and depth of change currently 
underway in the Chinese armed forces reflects a substantial shift in 
circumstances. These include a more realistic and comprehensive assessment 
of the security environment, as well as an internal push for reform that 
extends beyond the military to target the nation's huge and inefficient 
agricultural and industrial infrastructure. Although not as high on the 
nation’s reform priorities, the PLA has definitely benefited from this 
process is allowed to continue. It is precisely because these efforts have 
begun to have an impact in the last decade that the military doctrine 
guiding the PLA as the instrument of China's national interest deserves 
close attention. In addition it must be accepted (and it has been stressed 
here) that the reform outlined in this work represents a move beyond the 
superficial level of hardware and has reflected Beijing's perception that 
the security environment has permitted longer-term modernisation. A shift
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in this perception has precipitated/encouraged the changes evident in the 
defence doctrine and it is these reforms of the fundamental approaches to 
organisation and training - as well as of equipment - that suggest to the 
observer that the process will continue. The outlook for reform of the 
defensive and offensive capacities of the PLA is thus essentially 
positive - something that could not have been said for the armed forces, 
with any real confidence, if the shift from People's War had not been made.
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